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Introduction 
 
 
Money laundering is one of the most critical things that worry governments, both those 
who are rich and those who are poorer; in particular, this phenomenon has always been 
a big problem for Italian economy. In Italy the dangers of laundering are considerable 
because of the diffusion and pervasiveness of organized crime, the corruption and tax 
evasion. It is not only a problem in terms of crime, but it is a characteristic that weakens 
the economy and prevents social development, discouraging investment
1
; for example, 
it should be noted how organized crime reduce total population‟s income, because of the 
so called “pizzo”. Extortion, as well as directly subtract resources to entrepreneurs 
subject to racketeering, disincentives any investment in local economy. An economy 
that is mafia infiltrated is distorted by many ways: a merchant victim of the racket may 
consider “pizzo” as a compensation for a protection against competitors; moreover, 
laundering of criminal proceeds into legal economy imposes a competitive disadvantage 
to companies that do not benefit from this source of cheap money; finally, the links 
between criminal groups and corrupt public administration affect the provision of goods 
and services. 
The impact on economic growth of the perception of corruption and the lack of 
confidence that goes with it can be even more serious than those resulting from the 
corruption itself. As it is reported in the National Risk Assessment, according to a 
recent analysis conducted by World Bank, every point down in the ranking of 
Transparency International corruption perception causes the loss of 16% of foreign 
investments. Moreover, a study of Unimpresa
2
 shows that the phenomenon of 
corruption in Italy decreases foreign investment by 16% and increases of 20% the sum 
of contract costs. 
 
The set of laws introduced by each country involve both the aspect of persecution, with 
a gradual expansion underlying offences
3‟s list, both the strengthening of a prevention 
                                                 
1
 It's very hard to estimate the real effect of organized crime, as it's said on the document of 
Unioncamere, La misurazione dell‘economia illegale, page 2; more important, it's difficult to 
individuate any possible infiltration in  legal economy, especially in the Nord of Italy. 
2
 “Expo. Unimpresa, con corruzione in 10 anni -100 miliardi di Pil in Italia”, 12 maggio 2014 
3
 There isn‟t a legal definition of  underlying offence, but traditionally is defined as a crime but 
at the same time represents a constituent element of other criminal offence. 
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system, based on cooperation between public authorities and private operators. The aim 
of this partnership is to identify each possible suspected transaction of the proceeds of 
crime in the legal economy.  
Money laundering prevention consists, for example, on rules that limit the use of cash, 
or on the rules that impose to banks and professional obligations to cooperate with 
authorities and on seizure and confiscation measures, as required by Decree 159/2011; 
prevention phase is fundamental because it allows to intercept crimes when there is its 
cash flow effect. With regard to the repression phase, the main rules that talk about it 
are the Penal Code, on article 648 bis and the Decree 231/2007, which provides for 
administrative sanctions. 
Preventive action should be carried out in close connection with the prevention of 
criminal activities, because money laundering often is strictly connected with organized 
crime: laundering is the perfect solution of illegal activities of organized crime; an 
example is given by profits from drug trade, they cannot be totally used in such illicit 
behaviour, but they must be used in legal market. 
 
Money laundering methods are diverse and are constantly evolving: they range from 
trade-related operations to on-line banking. Money launderers may also operate outside 
financial systems, for example, through alternative remittance systems. This paper 
focuses on the relation between money laundering and criminal connected companies, 
i.e. business enterprises that appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business but are 
actually controlled by criminals. 
This thesis follows a branch of money laundering research in criminal companies; after 
creating a criminal company‟s database region from the north and centre of Italy, the 
aim of this paper is to prove whether there is a relationship between criminal enterprises 
and participations thereof. 
 
In the First Chapter, after a general description of money laundering and its legislation, 
there will be a more deepener illustration of the use of dirty money in companies that 
appear legal, but in reality they are used to clean dirty money, to mask illegal activities 
or to hide a criminal or the real owner. At the end of the chapter it will describes the 
reasons that can bring a criminal to decide to invest his money in companies, rather than 
keep it in a bank or reinvest it in other criminal activities. 
 
3 
 
The Second Chapter is dedicated to a fundamental element in combating money 
laundering: co-operation with other institutions, including banks, other financial 
intermediaries and professionals. They are obliged by law to report to appropriate 
authorities any suspicious transaction; moreover, they are the main recipients of this 
research, because the results will add this information up to other crucial factors that 
identify criminals companies. 
 
Finally, the Third Chapter is committed to a statistical analysis of criminal companies 
and their shareholdings; in order to be able to perform this analysis, criminal companies 
will be compared, using Stata, with a sample of not criminal companies. It will 
compare:  
 The existence or not of participations; 
 The total number of portfolio companies;  
 The participation fee. 
 
It is taken into consideration Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte regions. 
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First Chapter 
 
Money laundering: definition and its 
development through companies 
 
In order to make a complete and thorough analysis it is necessary to understand the 
structure of money laundering. This Chapter has the aim to define the perimeter in 
which to move; it will describe also the legislation that has dealt with this issue, both at 
national and European level. Later it will discuss the tasks of the two most important 
bodies that deal with the prevention of money laundering, Financial Intelligence Unit 
and Financial Action Task Force: both publish annual reports that are very useful 
because they allow to have an up-to-date knowledge, especially against the new 
methods used by criminals to launder money.  It was decided to introduce as of now 
these institution since their role is very important in the fight against money laundering, 
because this matter is very intricate and evolving very quickly and not always law is 
able to keep with. 
At the end, it will be analysed in more detail money laundering in criminal connected 
companies: here describes the methods used and the reasons why launders adopt this 
method, including the acquisition of minority interest.  
 
1.1 Definition of money laundering and its legislation 
Money laundering can be defined as “a process that employs financial, accounting, 
legal and other instruments in conjunction with an object that has either been used in, 
or derived from, unlawful activity. The primary process is to create a veil of legal 
cleanliness around the object. This veil not only prevents the object‘s association with 
unlawful activity from being accurately traced and identified, but also enables the 
object to be used in the legal economy with anonymity and without fear of criminal, 
civil or equitable sanction”4.  
Indeed, once cleaned, money cannot be easily traced from the criminal origins of the 
funds: money laundering allows criminal to make the reinvestment, which permits to 
                                                 
4
 K. Hinterseer (2002), Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a 
Comparative Legal Context , UK: Kluwer law International,  page 11. 
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increase their capital and it can be in turn reinvested in criminal activities, generating a 
kind of vicious circle
5
.  
Money laundering is the process that encourages and promotes the development of 
illegal activity; in this way, criminals attempt to hide the true origins and sometimes the 
ownership of the proceeds of criminal activities
6
. It is important that governments and 
authorities from all over the world try to prevent from legitimising the proceeds of 
criminal activities by converting „dirty‟ funds to „clean‟ funds, paying particular 
attention to financial system: the increased integration of the world's financial systems, 
and the removal of barriers to the free movement of capital have enhanced the ease with 
which criminal money can be laundered and it is complicated to keeping trace process. 
Indeed criminals are able to exploit all the opportunities offered by globalized economy: 
laundering tends to take place in an international context, focusing on countries that 
have less stringent regulation concerning client identification. 
From a national perspective, one of the main consequences of money laundering is that 
it has a negative effect on the transparency, good governance and the accountability of 
public and private institutions. Money laundering activity also causes damage to a 
country‟s national security and reputation and has both direct and indirect impact on a 
nation‟s economy. 
 
Typically
7
, money is laundered through a three stages process:   
 Placement, consist on investing illegal profits in the financial circuit, for 
example a business or a bank and it is characterized by the separation of those 
profits from the person who produced them. During this stage the proceeds are 
only physically deposited in the financial system, there isn‟t the real laundering. 
Money laundering techniques during this phase can be: smurfing and structuring 
and currency smuggling. With smurfing it is possible to make repeated 
payments or exchange transactions below the fixed threshold for supervision 
concerning money that has the same origin: the aim of this technique is to avoid 
any banking operations‟ monitoring. Another frequent technique during 
                                                 
5
 This definition is explained in G. Rodano (2001), Denaro sporco: politiche criminali, politiche 
di contrasto e ruolo dell‘informazione, Donzelli , pag. 125. 
6
 G. Rodano (2001), Denaro sporco: politiche criminali, politiche di contrasto e ruolo 
dell‘informazione, Donzelli, page 124. 
7
 Michael Zeldin, (1998),"Money Laundering", Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 1 
Iss 4 pp. 295 – 302 and others. 
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placement phase is currency smuggling, the physical transfer of money from one 
country to another
8
, and it can return later to its country of origin; 
 Layering is given by a set of financial and commercial operations design to 
losing track of the illegal origin. Once the cash is converted in a more 
manageable form, it is important to create distance between criminals and the 
illicit process.  
During this phase the main tasks identified by Financial Guard are the transfer of 
funds, the use of offshore companies, which are discussed later and wire 
transfer. In particular, wire transfer allows the transfer of large sums quickly 
between countries that are free of control. 
 Integration, is the final stage, where founds are completely cleaned and are 
assimilated into the legal economy. Now money can be used in commercial 
activities, such as a restaurant, or it could be invested in capital markets or it can 
be used in the purchase of gold or diamonds, thanks to their high convertibility 
into money. 
 
One of the main purposes of money laundering process is to “disguise their illegal 
origin”9: this activity help preventing actions taken by law enforcement and financial 
supervisors. In particular the Layering phase may involve disguising dirty money 
through the use of different methods
10
, that are used simultaneously or sequentially, or 
they are alternated; the continuously shifting of money launderers makes it difficult to 
find the financial crime. Specifically, the use of non-financial business is increasing, 
considering even illegitimate institution, for example shell companies, but even 
legitimate companies
11
. Integration of the cleaned money into the economy is the final 
stage of the process, and is accomplished by the launderer that making appear that 
money has been legally earned. Here it is extremely difficult to discern between legal 
and illegal wealth.  
Moreover, it should be noted how the last two phases of laundering, layering and 
integration,  are more dangerous, because, even if they are different operations, at the 
same time they can be merger in one phase, because criminals try to superimpose them. 
                                                 
8
 Typically the final destination is a tax haven. 
9
 This is the definition given by FATF. 
10
 The number and variety of transaction used to launder money has become increasingly 
complex, involving financial institutions and using non-bank financial institutions. 
11
 International Monetary Fund (2001)”Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money 
Laundering—Background Paper‖ page 7. 
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The best condition for launders is the one where it is possible to coincide the two 
moments, so that dirty money, which can more easily conduct to its criminal origin, 
does not remain in the circle for a long time.  
 
1.1.1 Anti-money laundering laws  
Art. 41 of Italian Constitution guarantees freedom of economic initiative, but it 
underlines that ―non può svolgersi in contrasto con l‘utilità sociale o in modo da recare 
danno alla sicurezza, alla libertà, alla dignità umana‖; here we find the basis of all anti 
money laundering legislation and it is also possible to note how the problem of money 
laundering and in general organized crime‟s infiltration in Italy had always felt as a big 
damage for economy and society. 
The nature of money laundering makes it very dangerous because it causes negative 
effects both economically and socially, and, thanks to the various techniques used, it is 
always more difficult to be identified. An effective anti-money laundering regime will 
have in place measures aimed at identifying any laundering activity and at using the 
evidence obtained in bringing the person or persons concerned to justice. 
This set of laws will also have in place measures aimed at preventing the loss of the 
proceeds of crime and at confiscating them.  
Anti-money laundering can therefore make a significant contribution to the fight against 
corruption in at least two main ways: 
 It could help uncover evidence of criminal activity through 
identification of suspicious movements of financial assets, thus 
increasing the chances of a successful prosecution of the perpetrator 
of the crime;  
 It also enables the tracing of criminal proceeds to facilitate their 
preservation, recovery and ultimate return to their rightful owner. 
 
As said above, anti-money laundering system has the aim to prevent the entrance of 
illegal origin resources into legal business, in order to preserve stability and integrity of 
economic and social context; moreover, thanks to its ability to identify criminal 
behaviour, it is also used to combat financing terrorism.  
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The Italian legal system has developed in line with international standards and EU 
directives.  
In Italy the violation of money laundering has been incorporated for the first time in 
Penal Code in 1978 with art. 648 bis; originally they were identified four types of 
offences, which are needed to accumulate dirty money. Those offences are: aggravated 
robbery, extortion, kidnapping and drug trade. The purpose of this article was to 
identify limited set offences for money laundering, in order to create a general better 
defined guideline with the requirements to reporting any possible suspicious 
transactions operations.  
In 1991 the legislature has decided to limit the use of cash in transactions over twenty 
million lire: this is because the main method used to launder money was through the use 
of financial intermediaries. The law
12
 also establishes certain requirements for financial 
intermediaries such as the identification clients‟ data, the recording of transactions 
relating to movements exceeding the threshold, the duty to report suspicious 
transactions to authority and the creation of a data base with all suspicious transactions. 
This legislation was altered in 1993 with laws n. 328 with the intent to increase the list 
of predicated offences. With the aim to carrying out Directive 2001/07/EC in 2004 it 
was issued d. lgs. n. 56, which extend the obligation to report suspicious transactions to 
other actors, besides the financial intermediaries, such as professionals like accountants, 
auditors, lawyers and notaries. This was necessary because launders make use of non-
financial entities for their illicit operations, and for this reason it was introduced new 
subjects to obligations. In this way Italian law also respected FATF recommendations, 
which were increased to extend their range of action.  
Significant changes have been introduced due to the Directive 2005/60/EC (the Third 
Money Laundering Directive); in Italy, it was adopted with D. lgs. 21 November 2007, 
n. 231. In particular, it focuses on a clear definition of the recipients of the obligation 
and on their analysis and identification of the beneficiary owner; moreover, a very 
important point of the law is the obligation of customer due diligence, which must be 
run according to of risk-based approach system. 
On 20th May 2015 the European Parliament approved the Fourth European Directive on 
Money Laundering which is compliant with anti-money laundering international 
standards developed by the Financial Action Task Force.  
                                                 
12
 Law 197/1991. 
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This came into effect by 27th June 2015. The most significant Fourth Directive‟s news 
concerns
13
: 
 The establishment of central registers in every European country 
containing accurate and current information on beneficial ownership 
of companies, legal entities or trusts; these records will be of public 
domain and can be consulted freely and without any restrictions by 
the competent authorities, as well as by journalists and by any person 
or organization that can demonstrate a legitimate interest;  
 News about customer due diligence by banks, accountants, lawyers, 
notaries, real estate agents and casinos with the exception of the 
professional relationship when representing a client in legal 
proceedings;  
 New rules to make it easier to trace the transfer of funds.  
 
Finally, one of the most important Fourth European Directive‟s aims is to provide much 
greater transparency in the shadowy business structures that are at the heart of money 
laundering schemes, as well as schemes used by businesses to avoid their tax 
responsibilities. It will be required that the ultimate owners of companies (the 
“beneficial owners”) are listed in central registers in EU countries, accessible to people 
with a legitimate interest.  In this way financial institutions will have to improve their 
reporting obligations in the sense of guaranteeing more accountability and transparency. 
 
Moreover, in 2014 there was the strengthening of tax compliance, that introduce a series 
of initiatives, that have transformed anti money laundering function of banks and other 
financial intermediaries into a super “compliance entity” which have to deal with legal, 
risk, operational and tax matters: a strong worldwide anti money laundering processes 
should be implemented in banks. 
 
The l. 186/2014 introduces, in line with European legislation, the activities of self-
laundering: it is the set of transactions carried out by those who have committed the 
                                                 
13
 http://uif.bancaditalia.it/sistema-antiriciclaggio/ordinamento-italiano/index.html  3 
September 2015 
11 
 
crime that cause dirty money
14
. Self-laundering is included among crimes which may 
give rise to administrative responsibility pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 231/2001.  
Furthermore, l. 186/2014 introduced voluntary disclosure, with the aim to oppose tax 
evasion: this operation is possible thanks to the new context of international 
cooperation, which has changed a lot and is based on principles of transparency and 
exchange of information
15
. 
 
The system of preventing money laundering is based on a series of collaboration 
between operators and administrative authorities. Operators are required to fulfil 
specific obligations and to comply with special rules:  
 The customer due diligence and record of relationships and 
transactions in Computer Archive;  
 The identification and reporting of suspicious transactions, integrating 
the "active cooperation";  
 The adoption of organizational measures and principals dedicated 
training, which forms the substrate of those obligations. 
 
In order to reduce the circulation of dirty money it were introduced restriction on cash 
transactions
16
. 
 
1.1.2 The rule of Financial Intelligence Unit and its “active cooperation” 
Italian Financial Intelligence Unit was established at the Bank of Italy, with Decree 
231/2007, in accordance with international rules, which provide for the presence in each 
country of a FIU with full operational autonomy and management and it is provided of 
functions that combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The decision to 
contrive Financial Intelligence Unit within the Bank of Italy was taken to use, for 
countering money laundering, the assets of the Bank information and integrate it with 
                                                 
14
 In the Penal Code we have art. 648 ter.1, which punishes anyone who: ‖chiunque, avendo 
commesso o concorso a commettere un delitto non colposo, impiega, sostituisce, trasferisce in 
attività economiche, finanziarie, imprenditoriali o speculative, il denaro, i beni o le altre utilità 
provenienti dalla commissione di tale delitto, in modo da ostacolare concretamente 
l‘identificazione della loro provenienza delittuosa‖. 
15
UIF (2015) “Rapporto annuale dell‘Unità di Informazione Finanziaria”,  page 15. 
16
 D. L. December 6, 2011, n. 201 (“decreto Salva Italia”) with effect from 6 December 2011 
reduced, from € 2,500 to € 1,000 the threshold of cash payments. 
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the information obtained by FIU; in this way it is possible to take advantage of its 
extensive financial expertise and to be able to maximize synergies. 
 
FIU is responsible for gathering information on money laundering cases, primarily 
through suspicious transaction reports submitted by financial intermediaries and other 
professionals; with that information it develops a financial analysis
17
, using all the 
sources at its disposal, and evaluates their relevance for the transmission to the 
investigative bodies and to judicial authorities, for an eventual progression of the 
repression action.  
After receiving the advisory, this is associated to other information included in the 
FIU‟s database and there is a first analysis designed to identify the priority of the 
warning; this operation is done by following the risk based approach principles. Reports 
that are easy or those that can be attributed to the facts already known are forwarded to 
Financial Police and the Anti-Mafia Investigation Department; those that appear to be 
unfounded are dismissed, even if law enforcement agencies are informed of these 
advisories. Reports that appear most relevant are subjected to in depth-analysis with the 
aim to identify the origin and the destination of the funds. 
The legislation establishes disclosure requirements for supervisors and professional 
associations. The Unit works with law enforcement agencies for the identification and 
analysis of abnormal financial transactions; it participates in the worldwide network of 
FIUs
18
 to exchange information essential to face the transnational dimension of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
 
For its purpose FIU has a series of model, practices and behaviour patterns: in 
particular, it uses its information database to develop, starting from the financial 
analysis of individual reports, a strategic value with the aim to highlight trends and 
operational models that are risky in relation to money laundering
19
.  
FIU focuses particularly on surveillance on possible types of corporate structure and 
other instruments that are suitable for shield the property, such as trusts and fiduciary, 
                                                 
17
 With financial analysis FIU there are a series of activities that enhance the information 
arrived: this help in widening the original context reported and to identifying  criminals . 
18
 According to FIU 2014‟s report, in 2014 there were 660 applications was made to foreign 
FIU. 
19
 UIF publishes “Casistiche di riciclaggio”: this work collects a series of cases with difference 
in terms of complexity and economic importance. This paper provide  an information tool that 
can help everyone in the detection of other cases due to money laundering.  
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or legal entities which are a kind of articulated corporate structure that collaborate with 
foreign entities, especially those located in in countries at risk or uncooperative
20
. 
At the end of the research and analysis there is a technical report prepared for the 
investigative agencies and it also discusses possible ideas for the investigative activity; 
FIU is the heart of money laundering system, because it connects different part of 
prevention money laundering system, the public with the private side, the national with 
international side. 
Beyond of operational analysis, which analysed every case of suspected money 
laundering, Financial Intelligence Unit plays a strategic analysis, aimed at identifying 
the weaknesses of the system. The strategic analysis using all available information, and 
enrich these information with input from public or private external sources. It is based 
on two pillars: the survey of patterns of financial behaviours and observations of money 
laundering financial flows. Another objective of strategic analysis is the evaluation of 
risk levels related to the system as a whole or considering a specific geographic area, 
means of payment or economic sectors. 
 
Among intermediaries and professionals that collaborate with FIU, it is worth to notice 
the importance of banks and their role in surveillance companies; they have personal 
incentive
21
 in combat money laundering because the infiltration of illegal activities in 
banking and financial system is a threat for their stability and for the proper conduct of 
their economic function. The legal and reputational risk that banks can face, resulting 
from an involvement, even unconsciously, in crime acts, can generate economic losses 
and it is potentially able to affect profitability and, ultimately, financial stability of 
intermediaries. In the Second Chapter it will be analysed in detail the role played by 
banks and other professionals, and it will be proved as they contribute in the fight 
against money laundering. 
 
1.1.3 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering 
The FATF is an intergovernmental body and it was established in 1989 with the aim to 
find and examine measures to combat money laundering: it is the principal anti money 
laundering multilateral organization.  
                                                 
20UIF, “Rapporto annuale dell‘Unità di Informazione Finanziaria”, May 2015, page 55. 
21
 This theory is sustained by that fact that most of advisories in 2014 (83,2%) came from banks 
and Poste. 
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FAFT is a voluntary task force: since its creation, it has been at the forefront of 
measures designed to counter criminal attempts to use the financial system for criminal 
purposes.  
Most notably, in 1990 the FATF established a series of money laundering 
recommendations. They established a series of special recommendations on the 
prominent threat of terrorist financing, whose aim was to unite anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing efforts into one universal instrument. The Financial Action Task 
Force came out with a revised set of 40 principles for AML; this was also incorporated 
with work done by the Basel Committee on customer due diligence standards. The 
FATF had earlier in October 2001 issued 8 Special Recommendations on Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism followed by a 9th recommendation on cash couriers in 
October 2004. Those Recommendations has a generic character: each country will have 
to adapt to the Recommendations and this would be realized in different ways, since 
that there are different legal system. Because money launderers change techniques over 
time, the FATF has to update its recommendations every couple of years: moreover, 
annually, the FATF presented a report on specific issues regarding money laundering. 
 
FATF, in close collaboration with its members, conducts regular typology exercises to 
uncover new money laundering techniques and to develop strategies for countering 
them: it examines techniques and counter-measures and reviews whether existing 
national and international policies are sufficient to combat the developing threat
22
. 
The Forty Recommendations can be grouped as follows
23
:  
a) Legal recommendation:  
- Field of application of money laundering crime (rec. 1 and 2);  
- Provisional measures and confiscation (rec. 3); 
- Customer due diligence and operation‟s registration (rec. from 4 to 12); 
- Reporting of suspicious transactions (rec. from 13 to 16); 
- Other measures to deter money laundering and terrorism financing (rec. 
from 16 to 20);  
                                                 
22
 Moreover, member countries complete annual self-assessment style questionnaire and the 
FATF regularly conducts a Mutual Evaluation Report examinations on individual jurisdictions, 
assessing the effectiveness of their national policies in dealing with money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 
23
 International monetary fund (2001)”Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money 
Laundering—Background Paper‖ page 29. 
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- Measures to be taken against countries that do not respect or insufficiently 
respect the FATF recommendations (rec. 21 and 22); 
- Regulation and supervision (rec. from 23 to 25);  
b) Recommendations for financial and non-financial institutions (Gatekeepers): 
- The competent authorities, their expertise and resources (rec. from 26 to 
32); 
- Legal persons‟ transparency (rec. 33 and 34); 
- Legal assistance (rec. from 35 to 39); 
- Forms of cooperation (rec. 40). 
 
1.2 Use of companies  
Both the FATF‟s Recommendations and FIU‟s behaviour pattern are of fundamental 
importance in the prevention of money laundering, particularly in the event that 
commercial companies are used to clean the money resulting from illegal activities.  
One of the most attractive methods to clean dirty money is the use of companies that 
operate in legal economy; a business has several advantages over on individual or a 
nominee. First, a business is expected to generate revenue, so that illegally acquired 
money blends with clean money. Second, the principal can establish the business in 
such a way that he controls it. Third, assets can be held in the business name, not the 
principal‟s, so a cursory asset check would not disclose the principal‟s interest. Finally, 
the business may also be used as a place where illegal activities can be conducted as 
well. 
Companies can be used both in the placement phase, in which dirty money is used 
within the company, for example to own assets, or it is used in the layering and 
integration phases. In this way it is more difficult to identify dirty money and it is 
possible to have only one phase of laundering, where the moments of placement, 
layering and integration phases are combined in a single moment. 
 
Obviously, money laundering cannot be done in the „open air‟ and it requires 
sophisticated means to disguise the origin of the assets. In particular, this phenomenon 
is contemporary in Italy; on one hand organized crime has deep roots and it is well 
distributed throughout the Country, on the other side economic crisis hit very hard the 
Italian economy: today companies are struggling to obtain loans from banks and they 
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not easily receive payments of their performance. In fact, the study conducted by 
Transcrime
24
 showed that the availability of obtaining resources from illicit markets 
allows criminal businesses to finance itself without having to resort to bank credit. 
Criminal infiltration in businesses appears to be a significant component in the national 
economy: criminals prefer limited liability company in which they can hide their 
presence, for example, through the use of nominees
25
.  
In the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research
26
 it is highlights that there are 
five reasons for which Mafia making investments in business:  
 Concealment of criminal activities: criminals may infiltrate legitimate businesses 
in order to hide the origin of illicit funds. When the purpose is money 
laundering, they may decide to infiltrate sectors with a weak or changing 
regulation and territories with high levels of tax evasion;  
 Profit maximization: include reasons related to the minimization of costs, or to 
the maximization of profit and return on investment; 
 Social consensus, by which it means criminal corporate social responsibility; 
 Control of the territory: control of the territory is a distinctive feature of mafia-
type organisations and has both a physical and a strategic component, in 
particular it refers to reasons related to the maximization of the main centres of 
power, including public administrations;  
 Cultural or personal reasons: reasons both personal, as in investment in family 
business, and cultural, in order to have more social prestige. 
 
In the document presented by Sos Impresa Confesercenti (2012)
27
 there is an analysis of 
economic sectors where proceeds of crime are invested; obviously, this is correlated 
with criminals‟ interests. At the top there is construction industry and all its phases, 
followed by commercial activities and food service, road haulage and entertainment 
industry. All those economic activities are business that enable a strong flow of money 
and require capital injections but poor managerial know-how.  
                                                 
24
 Transcrime (2013), Progetto PON sicurezza 2007-2013, Gli investimenti delle mafie,sintesi, 
page 150. 
25
 Transcrime (2013), Progetto PON sicurezza 2007-2013, Gli investimenti delle mafie,sintesi, 
page 8. 
26
  Levi, Michael, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. June 2015, Vol. 21 Issue 
2, page 275. 
27
 Sos Impresa Confesercenti (2012), Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, page 101. This 
study was made taking in consideration 100 confiscated companies.  
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Other studies suggest that Mafia groups “seem to prefer those markets that allow them 
to maximise their territorial control, to benefit from and expand their political 
relationships, to distribute jobs and sub-contracts and that are close to their personal 
and cultural background”28. This is because organized crime in Italy, especially in the 
south, is present in people's daily lives, both for historical and economic reasons. 
All those peculiarities perfectly fit with the aim of money laundering activities, that are 
to profit, because “Profit is fundamental to the goals of most crime and therefore 
criminals make great efforts to move illegally obtained money and other assets in order 
to convert, conceal or disguise the true nature and source of these funds”29. More 
deeper, traditional typologies of legitimate businesses‟ involvement in money 
laundering are cash intensive small businesses, such as restaurants or car washes, in 
which funds from illegal activities can easily be commingled with deposits of legitimate 
business receipts. Usually criminals use small businesses, that allow to bypass audit 
requirements, hence appearing „low risk‟ to authorities. 
 
This is also highlighted in Business Customers and Money Laundering Risk document
30
 
where it is explained that, thanks to global economy, not only large corporations are 
involved in international trade, but also small and medium-sized business. Import and 
export are critical issues of a company‟s risk assessment, because they facilitate flows 
of dirty money across country, but even it‟s easier to sell illegal products, such as 
trading in drugs or weapons; this because legal business creates a shield of protection 
against this type of goods.  
 
Limited liabilities company are particularly simple to establish and most state laws 
require only minimal disclosures of ownership during the corporate formation process, 
furthering concealment of this information from financial institutions and regulatory 
agencies. For these reasons a limited liabilities corporation can be established as a shell 
company, which has no physical presence and generates little or no economic value. 
                                                 
28
 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. June 2015, Vol. 21 Issue 2, p275, 23 p 
Levi, Michael, page 291; this analysis was of about 2000 companies confiscated in Italy since 
1983 to 2012. 
29
 FATF Guidance (2013), National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk 
Assessment, page 26. 
30
 Advancing Financial Crime Professional Worldwide (2013), Customers and Money 
Laundering Risk, page 7. 
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Since that there are legitimate business reasons for establishing a shell company, this 
entity type has become a pervasive tool for money laundering, not only in Italy. 
Holding companies and joint venture both have fundamental structures with the 
potential to obscure the entity‟s true beneficial owners and ultimately the actual purpose 
and activities in which the entity is involved: significant higher risk is present when the 
ownership structure includes multiple, complex subsidiaries (holding companies) or 
limited partners (joint ventures) that have no apparent commercial purpose. 
 
In the following paragraphs it will explained which are the main activities that drive 
criminals to launder money within companies; of course, the list is not exhaustive 
because launders are able to find new methods to clean money in a company, in order to 
make more difficult to discover the crime.  
 
The most popular money laundering schemes using companies are:  
 
1.2.1 Shell companies 
Shell companies are designed to perform some functions, but they don‟t conduct the 
normal business of a corporation. Some shell companies may be set up for a single 
purpose or hold just one asset; others may be set up for a variety of purposes or manage 
multiple assets, which facilitate the co-mingling of legal and illicit assets.  
Moreover, shell companies may be set up in many jurisdictions, including in certain 
offshore financial centres and tax havens. In addition, their ownership structures may 
occur in a variety of forms. Shares may be held by a natural person or legal entity, and 
they may be in nominative or bearer form. They may be used to hide the identity of the 
natural persons who are the true owners or who control the company
31
 Shell companies 
can be pyramided, that create a confusing path to follow, especially if it is organized in 
countries where there is a flexible jurisdiction
32
; in this way, finding the identity of the 
true owner become impossible. This is the reason for which shell companies are 
effective as layering devices. 
                                                 
31
 Commonly referred to as the beneficial owner.   
32
 That is, jurisdictions where law permits secrecy in business relationship. 
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As placement mechanisms, shell corporations have the appearance of legitimate 
business, and their bank account can be used to receive cash deposits or to transfer 
money. 
 
1.2.2 Offshore shell corporations 
The offshore companies are companies registered under the laws of a foreign state, 
usually in one of the 'tax havens', but conduct their business out of this state. Tax havens 
usually offer weak controls and tax regimes in favour of foreign investors. 
Confidentiality is a cornerstone of those countries: they do not provide information on 
companies based on their territory.  
For this reasons offshore companies are used to make reckless speculation, to make 
illegal operations or to hide budget losses.  
Moreover, the aspect of these companies, particularly useful for launders, is the lack of 
a requirement that shareholders be identified: for example, it is impossible to know who 
is the beneficiary of the company‟s current account. In this way off shore companies 
can be used like shell companies. 
It‟s not expensive or difficult to establish an off shore company; internet is making the 
creation of this kind of company easier than ever.  
 
1.2.3 Trust  
This institution has Anglo-Saxon origin, this is why it is not expressly regulated by 
Italian law. However, trusts that are established in a country where is its own regulation  
are recognized in Italy, as a result of the Aja Convention of July,1st 1985, regulated by 
law n.364/1989. 
Trust is defined as a technique that allows the owner of certain assets, defined as the 
settlor or garantor, to deprive the assets and confer them to another person or entity, the 
trustee. In this way it is created legal barrier, thanks to the trustee, that protects the 
grantor and the beneficiaries. If the trustee is bound by a confidentiality agreement, the 
true beneficial owner may be unidentifiable. Also, the asset protection attributes of 
trusts are often leveraged for illegal purposes, including money laundering and tax 
evasion.  
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1.2.4 Banking/Business combination 
Another money laundering schemes is banking/business combination
33
; in this case, the 
launderer is trying to take advantage of the use of a simple business and after move 
money into a bank. By doing this, the money launderer gives up all the flexibility that 
goes with dealing only in cash: now he‟s submitted to rigid rules, since that every 
transaction is recorded, every asset is accounted. In this case, it is up to the banking 
authorities to become aware the danger and they must conduct of their own risk 
assessments. Cash intensive business can be considered a more simple variation of 
banking/business combination: the cash intensive business is defined as a company 
whose business is mainly due to high number of cash transactions, such as restaurants 
and casinos. Because their sales are primarily in cash, funds from illegal activities can 
easily be commingled with deposits of legitimate business receipts. 
 
1.2.5 Real estate sector 
The use of real estate is an established method of money laundering: criminals buy 
high-value goods such as real estate as a way of laundering illicit funds. The reasons 
behind this technique is that criminals use dirty cash money to buy real estate, they can  
disguise the ultimate beneficial ownership of real estate and they can increase the value 
of the real estate, through renovation. Moreover, due to the international nature of the 
real-estate market, it is often extremely difficult to identify real estate transactions 
associated with money laundering or terrorist financing. Compared to other methods, 
money laundering through real estate can be relatively uncomplicated, requiring little 
planning or expertise. Large sums of illicit funds can be concealed and integrated into 
the legitimate economy through real estate. 
Financial Action Task Force
34
 gathers the most common methods to launder money in 
real estate sector in eight typologies, which are:  
 use of complex loans or credit finance,  
 use of non-financial professionals,  
                                                 
33
 As it is rightly noted by J. Madinger (1999) Money laundering : a guide for criminal 
investigators, page 333. 
34
 FATF, Money laundering & terrorist financing through the real estate sector, 29 June 2007, 
page 7 
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 use of corporate vehicles, manipulation of the appraisal or valuation of a 
property,  
 use of monetary instruments,  
 use of mortgage schemes,  
 use of investment schemes and financial institutions,  
 Use of properties to conceal money generated by illegal activities. 
 
Furthermore, criminals often use artificial transactions of properties: this method 
assumes the sale of a property at a higher price than its market value. For example, a 
launder has a million euros to clean in the legal market; he decides to buy a property at 
its market value, that is lower than one million, and then resells it to a compliant client 
for a million euro, the same amount that must be recycled. At the end, the compliant 
client receive what he paid for the purchase; this payment is made in cash, because cash 
payment are not traceable. 
 
1.2.6 Invoice scams 
Invoice is a bill for goods delivered or services rendered: there are purchase invoices 
and sales invoices. 
In the case that a company decide to deal with counterparties without commercial letters 
of credits
35
 can face the risk of incur in a trade base money laundering: this is a means 
of fraudulently transferring value. A classical method of achieving this value transfer is 
through over-invoicing and under-invoicing of goods and services. Using an invoice the 
amount shown can be whatever the two parties agree upon: if a money launderer 
controlled both ends of a transaction, great quantities of dirty money could be integrated 
into the economy, probably without anybody notices that. 
This kind of laundering schemes is particularly used for cross border operations. The 
misrepresentation of the price effectively transfers additional value between the 
                                                 
35
 LoC are used to mitigate the risk involved in dealing with overseas counterparties; LoC is 
irrevocable undertaking by which a financial institution promises to pay a specific sum of 
money to a beneficiary, provided stipulated documents are presented and all the terms and 
condition of the LoC are in compliance. 
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importer and the exporter. This method is very successful in money laundering 
processes, because there is minimal involvement of customs agencies and information 
sharing between countries
36
. Other techniques used to hide illegal movement of funds in 
trade finance is doing short/over shipping to misrepresent the quantity or quality of the 
goods, and the „phantom shipping‟, where all documentation is completely falsified and 
there is no shipment of goods
37
. 
 
In wider terms, it is possible to say that one of the primary characteristic of a criminal 
connected company is when it inflates sales reports or write cheques to accomplices for 
bogus service; in this way, a well-run front company can launder thousands of euros a 
day with little risk of detection. In general, any business that accepts cash and refunds 
the same with a cheque is primed for abuse of launders. 
 
1.2.7 Loan back schemes 
The purpose of the loan is to give the source of the money an appearance of legitimacy 
and to hide the true identity of the parties in the transaction or the real nature of the 
financial transactions associated with it: this scheme is used during the integration 
phase. 
For example, there are 1000 euros to integrate
38
: this could report in the financial 
statement as an ordinary income or it is possible to report it as a loan from offshore 
business. The criminal deposits, through a special purpose vehicle, this sum of dirty 
money in an off shore bank. At the same time criminal is the owner of another 
company, via another person, and this company operates in the legal system.  
If criminal wants to make an investment in the legal business, ha can use dirty money in 
the off shore bank as a collateral for a loan in another bank. Thus, the amount originally 
deposited at of the country offshores‟ bank will be used as the balance of the loan 
contract and the investment has been made thanks to dirty money, which has been 
cleaned. 
 
                                                 
36
 This process is described on Advancing Financial Crime Professional Worldwide (2013), 
Customers and Money Laundering Risk, page 7 
37
 Financial Conduct Authority (2013), Bank‘s control risk in trade finance, page 12. 
38
 John Madinger, Sydney A. Zalopany (1999), Money laundering : a guide for criminal 
investigators 
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1.2.8 Acquisition of subsidiaries   
As it has already been mentioned in the introduction, this thesis will analyse if a 
relationship exists between the laundering of money within the company and the 
existence of subsidiaries and affiliated companies, with the aim to identify the specific 
characteristics that may more easily discover criminal firm from non-criminal. In fact, it 
is reasonable to think that, thanks to the huge flow of money from illegal activities, it is 
easier to buy shareholding in other companies. 
A company is always looking for its best operating condition: that is why it buys stakes 
in other companies: the union of two or more entities has the stated aim to reduce 
competition and strengthen economic efficiency, pursuing the object of improving the 
functional capacity of companies grouped.  
In general, business combination have two objectives, one external and one internal: the 
first is to control a piece of market, the second refers to rationalize the business 
management, in order to increase productivity. As regards to criminal companies, they 
may have other reasons, in addition to those just mentioned, for deciding to buy shares 
in other companies, for example, to make more difficult to find detention of dirty 
money, or to have offices in other areas that can also be useful for illegal activities.  
In some cases, targeting businesses with economic difficulties facilitated the infiltration 
process, since the owners of the companies were eager to sell their shares before leading 
their business to bankruptcy; in these cases, criminals simply acquired the shares of the 
targeted business, and the acquisition process did not involve any illegal activity. 
This method used to launder money will be the subject of the Third Chapter, which has 
the aim to ensure, through the analysis of a sample for criminal and non-criminal 
enterprises the existence of a relationship between criminal factor and equity 
investments. 
 
1.2.9 Corporate liability 
Decree N.231/2007 introduced companies‟ responsibilities for violations resulting from 
the commission of a crime
39
: the purpose of the decree is to protect financial system 
from being used for money laundering or terrorist financing. 
                                                 
39
 Specifically, decree indicates that “i destinatari sono gli enti forniti di personalità giuridica, 
le società fornite di personalità giuridica e le società e le associazioni anche prive di 
personalità giuridica” (art. 1, co. 2). 
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In particular, art.52 of Decree 231/2007 forces management audit entities, such as the 
board of statutory auditors and supervisory board, to monitor and report violations of 
law
40. The information‟s duties regardless possible violations relating to the registration, 
reporting and limits the use of payment instruments and deposit, for example cash or 
savings accounts and anonymous or fake registrations. The combination of controls to 
prevent money laundering‟ crimes concerns on one hand activities with third parties, 
from other intra-group activities, carried out as part of the relationship between 
companies within the same group.  
 
1.3 The reasons behind the choice of using criminal connected companies 
In order to understand the reasons that lead the use of criminal companies to launder 
money in respect of the choice to keep the money in liquid form, it is useful to note how 
organized crime, since the 70s, used dirty money: in fact, during this years criminals 
have made significant capital investments in their areas of origin, acquiring farms, 
tourist complexes or small banks. But most of the dirty money remained liquid and it 
was sent to the Swiss banks or to other tax havens. During 80s there was an expansion 
of criminal economy, thanks to the expansion of internal market and the growth in 
demand for hard drugs; on the other side, the increased ability to identify real estate 
owned by criminals led to raising the threshold of the risk of expropriation. As a result, 
a larger share of criminal surplus remained in liquid form and it has taken the path of 
the banks and financial institutions in the northern and international banks. This is the 
reason why traditionally cash is considered to be the preferred means of payment for 
transactions related to illegal economy because it guarantees non-traceability and 
anonymity of trade.  
Looking at a study conducted by European Central Bank
41
, the use of cash in Italy is 
particularly high: the volume of transactions settled in cash is equal to 85% of the total, 
against an EU average of 60%. This element from one side can be seen as a different 
degree of development of financial system, as far as concern possible alternative 
payments instruments, such as electronic payments; form the other side this may reflect 
                                                 
40
 Confindustria,  Linee guida per la costruzione dei modelli di organizzazione, gestione e 
controllo  ai sensi del decreto legislativo 8 giugno 2001, n. 231 Approvate il 7 marzo 2002  
(aggiornate al marzo 2014), page 145. The fulfilment of information‟s duties should be 
appropriate to the specific supervisory powers. 
41
 Source: Ministero dell‟Economia e delle Finanze, Comitato di Sicurezza Finanziaria “Analisi 
nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio e finanziamento del terrorismo 2014”, page 8. 
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the heterogeneity in the size of the underground economy. In recent years the use of 
cash has suffered a steady decline due to the increasing use of alternative instruments, 
and the effect of fiscal tightening on the circulation of cash: this may be due to the 
introduction, with Decreto Salva Italia, of a maximum threshold of 1000 euros, even if 
the Government has increased the threshold to 3000 euro
42
, for cash transfers between 
individuals, for bank deposit or postal bearer or other bearer securities. Those 
restrictions have two purposes: to trace financial movements to contrast money 
laundering and to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance. Indeed, for transactions worth 
more than 3,000 euro it must necessarily resort to banks, to Italian post office, to 
electronic money institutions and to payment institutions: these institutions are forced to 
issue checks, for amounts exceeding € 3,000, which indicates the exact information 
about the name (business name) of the beneficiary and the „not transferable‟ clause43.  
The decision to raise the limit to 3000 euro was taken as a „liberal measure‟44: if on one 
side this can be seen as a step backwards in the fight against money laundering, it 
should be noted that in Italy, although there is the lower cash limit in Europe, tax 
evasion does not seem to have suffered. A study conducted by CGIA shows that there is 
very little correlation between the threshold limit of the use of cash money and tax 
evasion. Instead, a study conducted by Italian FIU
45
 shows that the greater the number 
of crimes per capita, the higher the incidence of cash payments observed in individual 
municipalities.  
Definitely, the introduction of this threshold is a reason why dirty money is redeployed 
in companies: moreover, since that dirty money is less liquid
46, it‟s easier to re-use it 
only in the same illegal circuit, for example in drugs traffic: laundering has the aim to 
separate money from its illicit origin and this is made even more efficient if it is cleaned 
in companies because it is more difficult to distinguish it from legal money. Major 
distortions of laundering is that there are financial capital at no cost and theoretically 
unlimited; dirty money is used by acquisition of direct or indirect control over a 
company or through managing of economic activities. This cause: alteration of the 
                                                 
42
 Source http://www.repubblica.it/ ; this new roof has been introduced with Legge di Stabilità 
2016 and it became law on 1
st
 anuary 2016. 
43
 Only the recipient can collect it. 
44
 These are the words of Interior Minister Alfano in a Rai interview 
(http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/ContentItem-630f2db2-ad45-4d61-a295-
9f785cea8d5a.html?refresh_ce, 26 October). 
45
 Annual report page 68. 
46
 Scuola superiore dell‟economia e delle finanze(2011), La prevenzione del riciclaggio nel 
settore finanziario, Testimonianza del Vice Direttore Generale della Banca d‘Italia, page 4. 
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conditions of fair competition between businesses and infringement of the principle of 
freedom of the market.  
 
Bank of Italy‟s Deputy Manager47 define laundering as a bridge between organized 
crime and civil society that gives criminals the tools to be integrated into the system, 
coming to sit on the boards of directs and contribute to economic, social and political 
decisions. As it was previously highlighted, the authorities should pay particular 
attention to this kind of laundering technique because it offers the possibility, for 
example to companies in trouble, to obtain large sums of money without having to 
resort to loans or mortgages with banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Scuola superiore dell‟economia e delle finanze(2011), La prevenzione del riciclaggio nel 
settore finanziario, Testimonianza del Vice Direttore Generale della Banca d‘Italia, page 4. 
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Second Chapter 
 
The importance of active collaboration 
 
In the previous Chapter, after  defining  the general concept of money laundering and 
after describing its set of laws, it has been described how criminals can clean dirty 
money by using companies that operate in legal businesses, including the use of 
subsidiaries. Before starting to statistically analyse if there exist a relation between 
criminal companies and equity participation in other firms, it has been decided to 
describe in detail one of the focal points of the fights against money laundering: the 
obligation to report suspicious transactions.  
Customers Due Diligence are at the core of effective anti-money laundering risk 
management: a good due diligence is the key to a wider anti money laundering 
environment, as it is a prerequisite for effective risk assessment, transaction monitoring 
and suspicious reporting. 
The choice of introducing obligations for banks and other intermediaries was taken 
because, over time, the evidence had shown that it was necessary to introduce deeper 
controls in entities where money has to pass; those entities are essential in being able to 
support any operation that is necessary to wash funds with illicit origin. 
In order to define a prevention system “effective”, it must be observed how participants 
create an inhospitable environment against money laundering; an active cooperation can 
make a substantial contribution in achieving this result: this is evidenced by the fact that 
criminals are constantly trying new laundering‟s techniques and tools to avoid being 
discovered. 
 
At the end of this chapter it will show the result of FIU 2014 Annual report, with the 
aim to see if active cooperation is truly useful in the fight against money laundering. 
Although the effectiveness of prevention system cannot be assessed only by looking at 
the change in the reports received, the results of those reports are an important indicator 
of the parties responsible to recognize behaviours that are effectively criminal. As it was 
said in the previous Chapter, laundering requires the existence of other crimes and is 
therefore normal that on these crime offenses have been individuated the investigation 
28 
 
start. Even in such cases, they provide a significant added value in terms of 
demonstration of crime and at the same time in terms of enrichment of the evidence and 
for the identification of criminal relations‟ networks.  
 
2.1 Money laundering risks 
As it was highlighted in the First Chapter, money laundering is a serious threat to legal 
economy, because it has the power to change the “rules of the game” in certain sector 
and, in the long run, it corrupt society as a whole. More in detail, the main reasons that 
lead to combat money laundering are
48
:  
 The social importance, because money laundering causes damage to society 
as a whole, especially within developed countries
49
; 
 The economic importance: fighting money laundering means also fighting 
tax evasion; moreover, money laundering has a direct negative effect on 
economic growth by diverting resources to less productive activities. Rather 
than being placed in productive channels for further investment, laundered 
funds are often placed into “sterile” investments to preserve their value or 
make them more easily transferable. Such investments include real estate, 
art, jewellery, antiques or high-value consumption assets such as luxury 
automobiles. Such investments do not generate additional productivity for 
the broader economy. 
 The legal importance, because there is a relationship between the level of 
anti money legislation and the prevalence of criminal activities, like 
organized crime and terrorist financing. 
 
Since new money laundering methods continuously emerge and present special 
characteristic, criminals can take advantage of different financial and legal systems of 
different countries
50
. Moreover, it is difficult to find a definition for money laundering 
                                                 
48
 The matter of money laundering is not just a problem about few states, because laundering is 
just the tip of the iceberg of criminal activities: behind it, there are other activities, such as 
human trafficking and  drog truffiking. Even OECD in his  document “Money laundering 
awareness” (2009) has highlighted this aspect, in order to raise awareness on money laundering. 
49
 This was demonstrated by a Bank of Italy‟ s study conducted in 2009, in which it was 
analysed what is the impact of crime on bank loan. In general, in countries where crime rate is 
higher, entrepreneurs face more costs for security and protection and may be discouraged to 
invest. 
50
 This could depend also on criminal‟s personal preferences and behaviour. 
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risk that is appropriate for all countries, because nations have different definition of this 
kind of crime
51
. These are the reasons why governments cannot fight alone and led him 
to introduce laws aimed to put forward countermeasures in order to combat money 
laundering more efficiently and more effectively. Anti-money legislation is relevant for 
two objectives: first, it reduces the possibility to use a company for purposes connected 
with financial crime
52
; second, it protects market confidence and reputation. 
 
Financial services institutions such as banks, non-banking financing companies, 
insurers, and capital market firms are generally the most favoured channels through 
which illicit money is laundered across the globe. Many financial services institutions 
may be associated with money launderers unknowingly, which is a primary reason that 
financial firms are subjected to stringent anti-money laundering regulations to track the 
trail of illegally-sourced earnings.  
In order to get benefit for the analysis that will be made in Third Chapter, it was decided 
to analyse which is the role that professionals, auditors and above all banks play in 
combatting money laundering, because they have more contact with commercial 
companies and thus can identify more easily the use of legal business to launder money 
or to hide illegal activities. Furthermore, the results of these analyses could be used 
together with other data to identify criminal companies from non-criminal. 
One of the sectors that is more vulnerable by laundering and crimes is the banking 
sector, in particular bank‟s credit market: these risks will experience loss as a result of 
fraud from direct criminal activity, lax internal controls, or violations of laws and 
regulations. Looking at KPMG‟s Global Anti Money Annual Survey (2014)53, most of 
the respondents said that money laundering is considered a high risk area within their 
business risk assessment, given the impact that anti money laundering compliance can 
have on the reputation, share price, and economic viability. 
This is also highlighted in Italian FIU‟s 2014 Annual report, which states that banks are 
highly exposed to the risk of being used to launder money, because of their 
interconnection system with foreign financial entities, their use of cash and their broad 
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 This is the reason why many international bodies, like FATF with its Recommendations, try 
to have a global definition of money laundering. 
52
 As it was illustrated in the First Chapter, launders use companies to clean money or to hide 
their illegal activities. 
53
 This survey was made based on 317 respondents participated across the financial services 
industry representing 48 countries,. 
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spectrum of activities. In short, their biggest risk is to lose the reputation and trust with 
other customers
54
.  
On the other hand, banks have interest to verify with which type of customers they are 
dealing with.  For example, if a bank receives a loan application from a company, it 
wants to make sure that this company is not engaged in illegal activity, this is because it 
could risk losing his money, and because it may be denounced by the authorities for 
cooperation with criminals. For these reasons, banks have personal interests to intervene 
actively in the fight against money laundering: public confidence in financial 
institutions, and hence their stability is enhanced by sound banking practices that reduce 
financial risks to their operations.  
Customer identification and due diligence procedures, also known as “know your 
customer” (Kyc) rules, are part of an effective anti-money laundering and countering 
terrorist financing (Aml/Cft) regime. These rules enhance the safe‟s operation of banks 
and other types of financial institutions and are an effective risk management tool.  
 
2.2 Regulatory landscape of active collaboration 
An effective Aml/Cft regime reduces the potential that the institution could experience 
losses from fraud. Proper customer identification procedures and determination of 
beneficial ownership provide specific due diligence for higher risk accounts and permit 
monitoring for suspicious activities. It is essential to raise awareness about the negative 
impacts of money laundering and inform about various resources that can be available 
to counter money laundering activities. 
As stated above, from the beginning of the fight against money laundering it was 
acknowledged the need to collaborate with non-authorities organizations, such as banks:  
the Basel Committee
55
 was among the first authorities to highlight the importance of 
cooperation with banks and other professionals to combat money laundering. The 
Declaration of Principles of the "Basel Committee" of 12 December 1988 argued that 
the approach against money laundering should necessarily involve the banking and 
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 The reputational risk is the risk on which Bank of Italy posesita attention on its “Decalogo”, 
an anty money document in which it lists the instruction to be observed for the identification of 
suspicious transactions. 
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 The Basel Committee was established in 1974 within the Group of Ten55, following the 
banking crisis in the domestic and international markets; its aim was to promoting the exchange 
of information between member countries and develop cooperation between supervisors to set 
up early warning systems in case of banking crises with international repercussions. The 
Committee members are representatives of the central banks or institutions responsible for 
banking supervision of each member country.  
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financial system and those banks, having direct contact with the customer, could be a 
source to obtaining information about economic transactions that they perform. The 
Basel Committee introduced the concept of "due diligence" that was defined as the 
investigative process that is put in place to analyse a person or company to obtain 
economic and financial information or other information included on the balance sheet. 
The Basel Committee is acknowledged of having introduced the principles for the 
prevention of money laundering and banking regulations supervisory practices, even if 
these documents represent only „best practices‟ approach to money laundering. In the 
document of 1988 are explained the motives that led to the decision to deal with the 
activities that banks and brokers can make and it is explained that the need to identify 
these principles arose from the fact that banks have an institution often used by 
criminals, for "make payments and transfers of funds from one account to another‖; for 
―hide the source and beneficial ownership of money; and to provide storage for bank-
notes through a safe-deposit facility”56. The Basel Committee has developed other 
general principles of banking supervision, which contain instructions for the prevention 
of laundering and, in particular, to the awareness of the customer knowledge: “Core 
principles for effective banking supervision”, which talk about knowledge of customers 
as the basis of prevention of the use of the banking system for money laundering.  
In 2003 the Committee, together with the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) published a joint paper on the standards anti-money laundering and anti-
terrorism applicable to the three regulated sectors (banks, insurance companies, 
investment companies). 
On January 2014 Basel has published new guidelines on the prevention and combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing; these guidelines conform to the 2012 
standards International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism and Proliferation processed by the FATF and will complement the aims 
and objectives. They refer to the FATF standards to assist banks in fulfilling national 
requirements based on those standards. 
 
In fact, as explained in the First Chapter, even FATF has shown interest in regulating 
active collaboration. Notably, FATF introduces Core Principles for effective banking 
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 Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money-laundering 
(December 1988) page 1. 
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supervision: for example, Core Principle 15, states that: ―Banking supervisors must 
determine that banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, 
including strict ―know-your-customer‖ rules, that promote high ethical and 
professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank being used, 
intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements.‖.  
The recommendations also call for „special attention‟ to be paid to all complex and 
unusually large transactions and to those transactions involving new or developing 
technologies. This is extremely important as the more intensive the controls placed on 
transactions taking place through banks and financial institutions the more likely is that 
criminals will resort to other methods to disguise the source of their wealth. 
 
At European level, the European legislator has introduced the duty of active 
participation with the Directive 91/308 / EEC of 10 June 1991; over time European 
Union has expanded the audience and it have been specified what actions they need to 
take in cooperation with the authorities, until  the Third Directive. As said in previous 
chapter, the fourth Directive, which is not yet recognized in Italy, has introduced 
significantly changes, even with regard of active collaboration
57
: tax offenses were 
included in the list of crimes that define criminal activity
58
, in this way they constitute a 
predicate offence of laundering. This means that, if there is the suspect that the origin of 
the funds can be derived from illegal tax, it will generate an obligation to make a 
suspicious transaction report. Finally, the sanctions of inappropriate measurement, the 
reporting of suspicious transactions and record keeping and internal controls are 
worsened. 
 
With regard to Italy, the first law that introduced obligations for intermediaries was law 
n. 197/1991: this law introduced the principle of active collaboration for which the 
intermediaries, previously only committed to facilitate access of information by 
authorities, they are obliged now to directly participate in the fight against money 
laundering. This law provided both obligations' identification, transactions‟ detection 
and recording, both to report suspicious transaction, independently of its amount.  
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 http://www.dt.tesoro.it/it/news/accordo_riciclaggio.html, 9 December 2015 
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 Art. 3, co. 4: ‖ ‗criminal activity‘ means any kind of criminal involvement in the commission 
of the following serious crimes: (f) all offences, including tax crimes relating to direct taxes and 
indirect taxes and as defined in the national law of the Member States‖. 
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Later, other rules have been introduced, with the aim of improving money laundering 
regulation. As it has been said in the First Chapter, today in Italy the law which 
regulates this crime is Decree 231/2007. 
Decree 231/2007 states on articles 12, 13, 14 who is compelled to observe the provision 
of this Decree; those subjects are
59
:  
 Financial intermediaries and other entities operating in financial sector, like 
banks, Poste Italiane, electronic money institutions and asset management 
companies; 
 Professional, like accountants, lawyers and notary; 
 Auditors;  
 Other entities, like activities that deal with transporting cash and activities 
engaged in managing casinos. 
 
In the following pages it will described what kind of controls these authorities must 
make; in this way it is reconstructed and defined the process that these institutions must 
execute against natural persons and legal entities, and that may be supplemented by the 
analysis that will be performed in the Third Chapter. 
Decree 231/2007 imposes obligations on recipients of this rule, which are: customer due 
diligence obligation (arts. 15 et seq); abstention‟ obligation from completing the 
transaction (Art. 23); registration obligation (arts. 36 et seq); mandatory reporting of 
suspicious transactions (Art. 41). 
 
Increasingly, legitimate businesses in industries traditionally perceived as low risk are 
acting as intermediaries in the three phases of money laundering for transnational 
organized crime and other illegal activity. Financial institutions should therefore modify 
and expand their customer due diligence beyond traditional high risk business customer 
profiles for money laundering – such as money transmitters or third party payment 
processors – and begin evaluating all business customers from a new perspective. 
 
2.3 The importance of risk assessment 
In the previous paragraph it was described how authorities, both at national and 
international level, have proceeded to outline the ways in which external authorities are 
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involved in fighting money laundering. The importance of risk assessment is 
highlighted by FATF, which states in Recommendation 1 that “Countries should 
identify, assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks for 
the country, and should take action, including designating an authority or mechanism to 
coordinate actions to assess risks, and apply resources, aimed at ensuring the risks are 
mitigated effectively.‖: through risk assessment countries mitigate their money 
laundering risk, because it is necessary that Public Authority monitors the risks of 
money laundering. This is the reason why it was published National Money Laundering 
on Terrorist Financial Risk Assessment, prepared as part of art. 5 Decree 231/2007. In 
this case the contribution of private sector is crucial in order to build a complete picture 
of national money laundering risks and to create a deepened risk assessment. Before 
starting to see what are the activities they are obliged to do, it is useful to understand 
what is risk assessment, that serves to highlight key risk areas; it describes how well 
those risk are managed and it test the controls that a firm has in place to mitigate these 
risks. Intermediaries and other professionals must be able to recognize a possible 
danger, especially when they have contacts with companies because, as it was said in 
the First Chapter, companies hide more easily dirty money, moreover they are able to 
mask illegal activities, such as drug trafficking.  
Financial firms must put in place systems and controls to identify, assess, monitor and 
manage money laundering risk; these systems and controls must be proportionate to the 
nature, scale and complexity of a firm‟s activities. In its Financial crime: a guide for 
firms, Financial Conduct Authority
60
 indicate what are possible examples of poor 
practice that a firm must to consider when evaluating its risk assessment. Financial 
firms must pay attention on their risk classification system, means that they should be 
able to classify low, medium or high risk and the reasons behind this choice; moreover, 
they should pay particular attention on new relationship, looking at their potential 
profitability and their danger.  
In the document “Frequently Asked Questions on Risk Assessments for Money 
Laundering, Sanctions and Bribery & Corruption‖ of  Wolfsberg Group61 it is possible 
                                                 
60
 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is a financial regulatory body in the United 
Kingdom, but operates independently of the UK government; even this is not an Italian or 
European body, it is useful for the purposes of understanding and managing risk assessment. 
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 Wolfsberg Group (2015),“Frequently Asked Questions on Risk Assessments for Money 
Laundering, Sanctions and Bribery & Corruption‖ , page 3. The Wolfsberg Group is an 
association of thirteen global banks which aims to develop frameworks and guidance for the 
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to see a standard methodology to conduct risk assessment, that is, determine the residual 
risk in every Financial Institution. The residual risk rating is used to assess whether the 
money laundering risks within the Financial Institution are being adequately managed. 
This involves three steps: 
 Determine the Inherent Risk62: this can be made considering five risk categories 
of its own Clients, Products and Services, Channels, Geographies and Other 
Qualitative Risk Factors. The Association recommends risk based approach‟s 
use, in order to assign a score for each risk factor which reflects the level of risk 
associated with that risk factor. It is advisable to create subcategories for each 
risk factor depending on the risk score.  
 Assess the Internal Control Environment: once the inherent risk have been 
identified and assessed, internal controls must be evaluated for their 
effectiveness in mitigating the inherent money laundering risk.  
In this phase there are all controls categories that will be illustrated later, such as 
Client Due Diligence, Enhanced Due Diligence, Record Keeping, Monitoring 
and Controls and others. 
 Derive the Residual Risk: once both the inherent risk and the effectiveness of the 
internal control environment have been considered, it is possible to determine 
the residual risk. In order to be clear and correct, the Association suggest 
creating a 3 tier rating scale, with High, Moderate and Low level of residual risk. 
  
2.4 Identification of the risk based approach 
Risk assessment is based on the risk based approach that is an essential foundation in 
allocating anti money laundering resources efficiently: this principle is included both in 
the FATF Recommendations
63
, both in European and Italian Decree.  
The first generation of anti money laundering solutions operated on a rule based 
approach, where the regulator determines the controls that the regulated must apply, but, 
as the sophistication of money laundering evolved over the years, it was necessary to 
                                                                                                                                               
management of financial crime risks, particularly with respect to Know Your Customer, Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing policies. 
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 Inherent Risk in this case represents the exposure to money laundering risk in the absence of 
any control. 
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 The risk-based approach is central to the effective implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations adopted in 2012.  Between 2007 and 2009, in order to assist both public 
authorities and the private sector in applying a risk-based approach, the FATF has adopted a 
series of guidance in co-operation with relevant sectors.   
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introduce an intelligence and more flexible approach to anti money laundering by way 
of customers risks profiling, suspicious activity reporting and monitoring. As it‟s 
noticed by Louis de Koker
64
 ―Risk is not unimportant because a reasonable regulator 
will determine the relevant controls based on its assessment of the risks. The main 
difference between the two approaches is the the allocation of responsibility for 
determining the risk as well as the appropriate risk management actions: the regulator 
(rule-based) and the regulates (risk-based).‖  The reason behind this choice is the fact 
that money laundering risks are not the same for every country: a country that is a large 
financial centre faces significantly different risks than a country that does not have an 
important role in the international financial market. The risk based approach enables 
countries to use this resources more wisely by devoting them the areas where the risks 
are the highest; the same holds for banks and other institutions, because the revised 
Recommendations allow countries to permit individual institutions to design elements 
of their anti money laundering control measures on a risk sensitive basis. In this way it 
is possible to hold intermediaries responsible in the application of the right level of 
control and at the same time give them freedom to make decision: what is important is 
to make a proper control
65
. 
The most recent update of the FATF Recommendations, in 2012, emphasises the risk 
based approach even more than previous version of the standards: the objective of the 
risk based approach is to ensure that anti money laundering measures are commensurate 
with the risk identified, as well as to enable decision making on effective resource 
allocation.  
With regard to Italian Regulation, art. 20 of Decree 231/2007 says that the burden of 
proof that the entity has select which is the customer profile to be monitored. The 
reporting of suspicious transactions is entrusted to the weightings of information 
obtained, also based on customer history: to do this, it is useful read a Bank of Italy‟s 
provision
66
, which explain how to interpret article 20 of the Decree. Particularly, 
considering legal entities, banks should verify if in the past the customer or, in the case 
of a legal entity, its related person, have received sanctions for violation of anti money 
laundering rule. It is very important to understand what are the aims of the company and 
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 Louis de Koker, (2009),"Identifying and managing low money laundering risk", 
Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 16 Iss 4 pp. 334 – 352, page  336. 
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 Art. 16 D.lgs: 231/2007. 
66
 This document is “Provvedimento recante disposizioni attuative in materia di 
adeguata verifica della clientela, ai sensi dell‘art. 7, comma 2, del Decreto Legislativo 
21 novembre 2007, n. 231.‖, 2013, page 10 and subsequents. 
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how it tries to achieve them: that information can be known not only by reading its 
Status but also watching what kind of operations it performs to see if its activities 
correspond to its purposes and its intended nature.  
It is also important to pay attention on the legal form choose: as an example, in the First 
Chapter it was highlighted that criminals often use for the creation of a company the 
Limited legal form, because with this type of structure it is possible to hinder the 
identification of the beneficial owner. 
Banks must scrutinize customers‟ activity; this imply to look if the companies has 
business or financial connections or it has shareholdings with foreign entities, 
particularly if it is a state that present a deficient money laundering legislation or that 
belongs to the Non-Cooperative Countries
67
.  
Then, there are other factors that may alarm banks: for example, if a company is in 
financial difficulties, it may be more exposed to the risk of criminal infiltration. There 
are also activities, which by their nature, are more exposed to the risk of money 
laundering and that for this reason they must be analysed in a more specific way: the 
cash-intensive business, thanks to their high use of cash, can be used by criminals to 
clean money. 
The last customer‟s feature that must be analysed is its geographical interest area: if a 
company is based in an area that is economically weak and has a high degree of 
infiltration of crime has greater risk
68
, especially if this area is abroad. The same applies 
if a company holds interests in other companies that are based in areas at risk, as it will 
see in Third Chapter. The same holds for geographical location of the transaction 
requested by the customer. 
On article 20, co. 1, letter b) the Legislator has introduced criteria for evaluating the risk 
of  laundering connected with the type of operation; it is observed type of operation, the 
implementation procedures, the destination‟s country or countries of the product and its 
total amount
69
.  This is because institutions subject to Decree 231/2007 must be able to 
prove to authorities that their measures taken are appropriate to the level of risk of 
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 In those countries, that are also called „tax haven‟ countries,  anti money laundering rules are 
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Law May 22, 2010, n. 73 all Italian entities who conduct business operation with them have the 
obligation to report to Italian Tax Office all those transactions, but only if  the total amount of 
such transactions exceed the threshold of € 10,000. 
68
 One way to determine the level of risk in money laundering is to look at the use of cash, as it 
is not traceable; in Italy, National Risk Assessment has produced a ranking of the provinces 
where there is an excessive use of cash andare therefore more exposed to the risk of money 
laundering.  
69
 Art. 20, co. 1, D. lgs. 231/2007. 
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money laundering or terrorist financing. For the money laundering risk‟s evaluation 
financial institution must refer to instruction issued by Bank of Italy, which is called 
Bank of Italy Handbook. 
 
2.4.1Bank of Italy Handbook 
This handbook was issued in 2001, and its goal was to help all financial intermediaries
70
 
in the identification of money laundering‟s potentially suspicious transactions: in a later 
moment, in 2010
71
, Bank of Italy has published new ―indicatori di anomalia‖ for 
intermediaries: here, twenty-one cases of anomalies are indicated, which in turns are 
disaggregated into various “sub-indices”.  In this list it is possible to find both indicators 
that are updated, and others that are completely new; this is because Financial 
Intelligence Unit analysed the evolution of the most commonly behaviours discovered 
in their reports. Those indicators are then issued by different authorities, depending on 
the subject: Bank of Italy issues provisions for financial intermediaries and other 
entities operating in the financial sector; the Justice Ministry, in consultation with the 
professional orders, is responsible for professionals; the Interior Ministry is responsible 
for the remaining non-financial and public administrations. 
This document demonstrate the importance of active collaboration  and the need of 
these institutions get going to know their costumers and be able to assess whether the 
transactions they carry out are related to their activities or result from illegal activities. 
This Handbook is divided into two parties: the first one regulates rules that 
intermediaries must meet to properly carry out their monitoring role; the second one 
provides a list of the main abnormality indicator of operations that should be controlled 
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 Specifically, as it is sayed on article 2, the beneficiaries of this provision are: “banche, Poste 
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 Resolution 616 of August 24; source Ranieri Razzante, 
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in a deeper way
72
. With this list financial institutions are able to reduce uncertainty 
margins related to the fact that this kind of evaluation has a „subjective‟ base and it is 
strenuous to identify all possible existing type of offences. Moreover, they must 
consider case by case: as an example, an operation cannot be justified for a company, 
but it may be economically justifiable if requested by another client.  
Thank to Bank of Italy Handbook is it possible to reduce the costs necessary to make 
this analysis and it is possible to properly conduct the burden of reporting suspicious 
transactions. 
 
Specifically, in the first part Bank of Italy clarifies that the suspicious transaction report 
must be made even if the underlying offense has already been reported to authorities. 
About this, Razzante in his article explain this with an example: if the bank becomes 
aware that his client has committed a fraud on checks, the bank will report the customer, 
but it must remember to warn of potential suspicious transaction, if there are the 
conditions of that. This is possible because there exist a deep knowledge of the 
customer, through the Know Your Customers principle, in which Legislator requires to 
identify and record in Centralized Computer Archive both the data of owner‟s operation 
both the data of beneficial owner. It is clear that the principle is particularly important 
with regard to the case of a company, given the fact that often it is used to hide the 
beneficial owner, which could be a person linked to crime. Moreover, in addition to 
Know Your Customers rules, there exists a more objective analysis, an informatics 
support called GIANOS
73
: with this system it is possible to identify anomalies from 
customer‟s normal activity. 
Combining subjective and objective elements it is possible to have a complete 
knowledge of the customer and it make possible to find more easily suspicious 
transactions because, based on the economic and financial profile of the customer, 
intermediaries can decide how to carry out the economic analysis. As an example, 
considering a company, before starting to see anomalies found by GIANOS, 
intermediaries should analyse the company, such as knowing its field, its economic 
context and the existence of holdings in other companies.  
There are other factors that make authorities suspicious, for example when there are 
outliers in certain balance sheet items: in particular in the Third Chapter it will try to 
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understand if there exist a relationship between criminals companies and the presence of 
equity participation. 
 
With regard to the second part, the indicators have the aim to reduce the margins of 
uncertainty associated with subjective or discretionary behaviour; moreover, they 
contribute to the proper and uniform commitment to report suspicious transactions. It is 
worth to notice that this does not mean that the presence of one of those indicators it is 
not need to immediately send a report to the FIU, but supervisors have to pay attention 
to the customer. 
In his document ―Provvedimento recante gli indicatori di anomalia per gli 
intermediari‖ Bank of Italy make a list of indicator of possible suspicious transaction: 
particularly, there are six macro areas
74
: 
 Anomaly indicators related to customers: the list starts with customers because 
there is the need to highlight the importance to the identification of beneficial 
owner and truthfulness of information given by customers. This, in particular, is 
important considering companies because, as it was said in previous Chapter, 
firms permit to hide more easily the beneficial owner and the origin of money ; 
 Anomaly indicators related to operations: here financial intermediaries must pay 
attention on the primary activity that the company should carry and what it 
really does. It is also important the kind of operations companies carry out: as it 
was said in the First Chapter, launders often use companies to hide dirty money 
and to pass this money into other hands using false invoices which take only the 
passage of money but not the goods. Moreover, financial intermediaries should 
pay attention operations that appear disadvantageous for the firm: if, for 
example, a company makes transactions involving sales or purchases at a price 
that is significantly disproportionate to current market value, this may hide a 
suspicious transaction
75
; 
 Anomaly indicators related to means of payments: this kind of indicators are 
related to the abuse of use of  cash, because, as explained above, dirty money 
often remains in cash; 
                                                 
74
 For coherence, it was decided to report what are possible suspicious behaviour related to legal 
subjects. 
75
 In general, intermediaries must pay attention on those transactions in which there is transfer 
of large sum of money, but they are not justified considering the activity performed by the 
company, especially if the move is made with foreign companies and the relations between the 
parties can not be justified. 
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 Anomaly indicators related to financials tool operations: in this case 
intermediaries must pay attention on the activities the company seek on 
purchasing and selling of financial instruments, looking at whether these 
operations are consistent with its economic and financial profile;  
 Anomaly indicators related to financing terrorism: since the system for money 
laundering controls is used also to counter terrorism, financial intermediaries 
must ensure that the transactions of their clients are not related to terrorism 
financing phenomena. The international system for preventing and combating 
the financing of terrorism is based on the application of restrictive measures to 
"freeze" the funds held by “designated” individuals and legal entities identified 
by the United Nations and the European Union: those measures have a legal 
basis on Leg. 109/2007
76
. 
 
As highlighted by Pietro Cenci
77
 it is important to remember that, if a financial 
intermediaries finds one of those indicators, it must not immediately report it to the FIU, 
but it involves a deepening of the suspected operation; moreover, it is very important to 
make a careful assessment of the operations on which money is transferred often for 
large sums, this is because often this tool hides significant conduct regarding money 
laundering. 
  
2.5 How to protect from money laundering risk  
The importance of risk assessment is highlighted in many Documents, because it helps 
all financial institution to have adequate policies and processes to prevent the bank from 
being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for all kind of criminal activities, including 
money laundering. Thanks to risk management process it is possible to create an up-to-
date customer profile and it helps both the intermediary and the financial system as a 
whole: particularly, the risk management process is necessary to pay more attention on 
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categories that are more involved in the system of laundering: the FIU annual reports 
show that there are few advisories of sophisticated mechanisms, such as the use of 
corporate mechanisms
78
. 
Paragraph 2.3 has been shown the three steps to conduct an adequate risk assessment: as 
it was said in this paragraph, a bank should develop a thorough understanding of the 
inherent money laundering risks, and those procedures must be designed and 
implemented to adequately control the identified risks, as it was said by Basel 
Committee:―the policies and procedures for CDD, customer acceptance, customer 
identification and monitoring of the business relationship and operations (product and 
services offered) will then have to take into account the risk assessment and the bank‘s 
resulting risk profile‖79 .Of course, as it was explained in paragraph 2.4, this is based on 
operational data and other internal information collected by the bank as well as external 
sources of information  
For risk management it is essential to create an adequate control system: the Basel 
Committee pinpoint “three lines of defence”80 that a bank should have to control the risk 
of its business. A strong oversight of anti money laundering risk management and the 
adoption of a robust ethical stance by senior management are fundamental to the 
operation of effective AML systems and controls. 
 The first line of defence is the bank‟s business units, like its front office or its 
customer-facing activity. They are the first that come into contact with 
customers and consequence, they are the first who can become aware of 
anomalies: this is the reason why it is fundamental to provide them guidance on 
how to keep and detect suspicious transactions.  
 The second line of defence includes the chief officer in charge of anti money 
laundering, who is responsible for monitoring of the fulfilment of all anti money 
laundering duties by the bank; in order to fulfil his duties, he should make 
sample testing of compliance and review of exception reports to alert the board 
of director. Moreover, the chief officer should be in contact with all anti money 
laundering issues for internal and external authorities, including Financial 
Intelligence Unit. To do this the chief AML officer should be provided with 
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43 
 
sufficient resources to execute all responsibilities effectively and above all play 
a central role in the bank‟s anti money laundering regime. 
The AML office should be independent and robust and it should have a direct 
reporting line with executive management; it is responsible to the creation of an 
adequate anti money laundering solutions landscape, through which it is possible 
to understand and prevent money laundering issues. First of all, it should focus 
on formulating a compliance policy, assess the risks of money laundering and 
create a strategy, evaluate and select anti money laundering tools and assess 
technology. Secondly, it is responsible of the creation of a robust data 
exploration and visualization system and this is given also by the modification 
of rules to reduce false negatives or positives 
 The third line of defence is internal audit; in particular, a bank should establish 
policies for conducting audits of the adequacy of the bank‟s AML policies 
identified risks, the effectiveness of bank staff in implementing the bank‟s 
procedures, the effectiveness of compliance oversight including parameters of 
criteria of automatic alerts and the effectiveness of the bank‟s training of 
relevant personnel.
81
 
 
Of course it is essential to create collaboration between these three steps and this can be 
achieved through the use of reports, such as suspicious activity reports and customized 
reports for internal and external purposes. In this way it is possible to report solution, 
perform multidimensional analysis and create a business intelligence dashboard. It is 
essential that senior management take responsibility for the firm‟s AML measures; this 
includes knowing about the money laundering risks to which the institution is exposed 
and ensuring that steps are taken to mitigate those risks effectively: for this purpose, 
they must be informed about decisions of entering or maintaining a business 
relationship and they must be provided of an accurate picture of the risk to which the 
firm would be exposed if the business relationship were established or maintained. 
Financial institution should have procedures in place to ensure that there is a clear 
allocation of responsibilities and an appropriate approval of client relationships, in 
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44 
 
particular for those accounts which were assessed as high risk from a money laundering 
perspective. 
 
2.6 Customer identification and Due Diligence
82
 
As stated above, the private sector is a potential key user of any ML risk assessments, 
because the bank should have a thorough understanding of all the risks associated with 
its customers: in particular, financial institution may have valuable information on the 
structure, organisation and size of sectors to help with determining the level of risk 
presented and to assist in identifying vulnerabilities
83
. 
The anti money laundering Directive allows banks to determine the extent of customer 
due diligence measures on a risk based approach and for this reason it is possible to 
“tailor” the controls. 
Customer Due Diligence consists on measures taken to all entities obliged by law to 
identify their customers and to verify the customer‟s identity by using documents or 
reliable independent sources; it also includes obtaining information about the purpose 
and reasons for opening an account, anticipated account activity, clients‟ business and 
business structures. In his way it is possible to define the money laundering and 
financing terrorism risk profile attributable to each customer. 
All banks and other financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place 
to conduct due diligence on its customers sufficient to develop customer risk profiles 
either for particular customers. In this way the risk profile facilitate the identification of 
any account activity that deviates from behaviour that would be considered “normal” for 
the customer. Even the Basel Committee
84
 considers that the adoption of an effective 
due diligence an essential part of bank‟s risk management practices, as banks with 
inadequate due diligence programmes may be subject to significant risk, especially legal 
and reputational risk. 
Customer due diligence is one of the focal point of D. 231/2007: the first Chapter of the 
second Title of the law is dedicated to it; from 1
st
 January 2014 new obligations have 
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done using procedures that assign automatically the risk class. 
84 Basel Committee (2004). 
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been changed on the  basis of Bank of Italy Instructions, published on April 2013
85
. The 
previous law, Law n. 197/1991, for Customer Due Diligence considered only the 
collection of customer‟ data and information, such as his name, surname, date of birth, 
but it was clear that those kind of controls were not sufficient: specifically, the law of 
1991 did not consider constant and continuous monitoring, that is essential to detect 
potential problems and anomalies associated with the operations made by the customer. 
It should be notice that the Decree provides standards both in case of new customers‟ 
identification both in case of existing customers‟ due diligence; in this way it is possible 
to identify money laundering risk and it is possible to properly evaluate whether to 
proceed or not with their relation.  
Customer due diligence consists on four tasks:  
 Customer‟s identification; this must be proved on the basis of documents, data or 
information obtained from a reliable and independent source. In particular, if the 
customer is a legal entity, the identification must be made against the customer, 
but even against the performer of the operation, looking at his identification 
information and about his power of attorney; 
 Identification of an eventual beneficial owner: where the client is a company, it 
is important to be able to follow the chain of title to know who is the beneficial 
owner and conduct due diligence on the principal beneficial owners. It occurs 
both thanks to information provided by the customer, who is obliged
86
 to 
provide all information necessary to enable the entity to fulfil its obligations, 
either by using public documents;  
 To obtain information on the purpose of the account and, if applicable, the 
occasional transaction; 
 Constant control over the business relationship. 
 
Article 15 considers cases where financial intermediaries are obliged to do customers 
due diligence: when they establish a continuing relationship
87
; when they carry out 
occasional transactions, which involve the handling of money for an amount not less 
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 For auditors these new obligations are based on the "CONSOB Regulation" published 
December 2013. 
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 Decree 231/2007, art. 21 provide that ―I clienti forniscono, sotto la propria responsabilità, 
tutte le informazioni necessarie e aggiornate per consentire ai soggetti destinatari del presente 
decreto di adempiere agli obblighi di adeguata verifica della clientela‖. 
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than 15,000 euro, regardless of whether they are carried out with a single operation or in 
several operations that appear connected; when there is suspicion of money laundering 
or terrorist financing; when there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
information previously obtained. 
On the other hands, professional and auditors must follow article 16, in which there is 
the duty to check if customers professional performance has for object goods or means 
of payment that are equal to or greater than 15,000 Euros, this is also true in the case of 
operations split; when the operation has indeterminate value; when there is suspicion of 
money laundering or terrorist financing; when there are doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of information previously obtained. 
One of the main challenging tasks is to confirm information obtained on customer and 
beneficial owner: as stated above, customer data should be compared with other sources 
"reliable and independent"
88
; according to the risk-based approach, these checks must 
be made in an appropriate manner, in the light of the risk profile of the customer. In all 
these cases the addressee of the rule evaluates whether to perform further evidence, and 
it may resort to entities that provide economic or commercial information or to more 
independent sources.  
 
Control that runs on existing customers must be constant, in this way the client profile is 
updated and it is possible to identify elements of inconsistency, which might be related 
abnormalities;  to do this they analyse customers‟ operations and after they compare 
them with other information. This operation is called ongoing monitoring and it is an 
essential aspect of effective ML risk management, because in this way they are 
consistent with what the entity knows about the customer. 
The update frequency is determined by each institution on the basis of their specific 
risk. The results of these audits may lead to the update of their own information and 
their risk profile, or it can lead them to make other checks; in the extreme cases, it can 
lead to reporting of suspicious transactions, freezing of funds, to abstain from 
performing the transaction or the termination of the relationship.  
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 Bank of Italy mentions some of these sources, such as public records, private authenticated 
documents, documents of the chamber of commerce or other register, deed of 
incorporation,balance sheets, statutes; information from public authorities, including Public 
Administration, even from foreign states. 
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Those involved in the customers due diligence are required to keep obtained 
documents
89
, in order to demonstrate to the supervisory authorities that the followed 
procedures were correct to fulfil their legal obligations and to allow their use in the 
context of investigations of money-laundering operations, financing of terrorism or 
other crimes. Moreover, these documents can be useful for FIU during his in-depth 
analysis. It is considered that the documents will be kept for ten years from the start of 
occasioning operation or from the date of closing of the continuing relation. 
Financial Services Report
90
 for customers‟ verification suggest including inspection, 
made by managers of the institution, at their homes or business, both at the start of a 
relationship and also on an ongoing basis: this may allow substantiating clients‟ 
personal and business circumstances and cross referring these to patterns of activity on 
clients‟ accounts. 
 
Article 23 of the Decree provides that, in case the entities which must follow those roles 
are not able to respect them, they cannot establish the relationship with the customer. 
The abstention duty is, as it has been defined by Pietro Cenci
91
, is the obvious corollary 
of the due diligence, because, if the subject of the Decree cannot verify their customers, 
it‟s impossible to create any relationship between them. In the case that the obligation to 
report suspicious transactions to Financial Intelligence Unit, these are triggered by a 
decision of the entity, but only in the case of money laundering and terrorist financing 
suspect it is compulsory.  
Finally, there are cases where this prohibition does not apply: when the abstention is not 
possible on the basis of legal obligations, where the execution transaction by its nature 
cannot be postponed and when abstaining may impede investigations
92
. 
 
2.6.1 The treatment of high and low money laundering risks  
Risk based approach entails that compliance must be adapted according to the money 
laundering risk associated with the profile of the client concerned. This is the reason 
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why the Decree 231/2007 has introduced "enhanced requirements due diligence" and, in 
other cases, where the risk is lowest, the "simplified due diligence obligations". These 
two extreme cases are interesting to observe because, if on one hand the enhanced due 
diligence has an object that must be handled with care, on the other obligations 
simplified are often overlooked because the risk based approach focuses attention on 
high-risk matters. At the same time, simplified controls are easier and cheaper to 
implement and maintain and, if correctly implemented, they free up resources that can 
be focused on higher risk cases. 
 
With regard to simplified customer due diligence, it is regulated by articles 25, 26 and 
27 of the Decree 231/2007; these simplified procedures for customer due diligence 
apply when the customer falls into the following categories: ―a uno dei soggetti indicati 
all‘articolo 11, commi 1 e 2 , lettere b) e c); un ente creditizio o finanziario comunitario 
soggetto alla direttiva; un ente creditizio o finanziario situato in uno Stato 
extracomunitario, che imponga obblighi equivalenti a quelli previsti dalla direttiva e 
preveda il controllo del rispetto di tali obblighi; una società o un altro organismo 
quotato i cui strumenti finanziari sono ammessi alla negoziazione su un mercato 
regolamentato ai sensi della direttiva 2004/39/CE  in uno o più Stati membri
93
, ovvero 
una società o un altro organismo quotato di Stato estero soggetto ad obblighi di 
comunicazione conformi alla normativa comunitaria‖. 
Therefore, a simplified due diligence is chosen if the customer is a bank: this rule 
applies because it assumes the absence of risk of money laundering, since both parties 
are financial intermediaries. It is important for our analysis to observe that article 25 
does not apply to trusts, as they are always required to provide, upon request, the 
information about the settlor to the one who has to carry out an operation from among 
those listed in the decree; for the simplified due diligence, these kind of data are not 
provided. Of course, there could be situation in which it is not possible to conduct a 
simplified due diligence; Bank of Italy lists these cases
94
: ―vi siano dubbi sull‘idoneità 
o la veridicità delle informazioni acquisite ai fini della riconduzione del cliente alle 
categorie sopra indicate; non vi siano più le condizioni per la configurazione di un 
basso rischio di riciclaggio e di  finanziamento del terrorismo – che consente 
l‘applicazione della procedura semplificata – in base al giudizio dei destinatari, che si 
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avvalgono, a tal fine, degli elementi di valutazione indicati nella Parte Prima, Sezione 
II; vi sia comunque il sospetto di riciclaggio o di finanziamento del terrorismo; la 
Commissione europea adotti, con riferimento ad un Paese terzo, una decisione di 
accertamento a norma dell'articolo 40, paragrafo 4, della terza direttiva 
antiriciclaggio; in tal caso, i destinatari delle presenti istruzioni non possono applicare 
misure semplificate di adeguata verifica della clientela agli enti creditizi e finanziari o 
società quotate del Paese terzo in questione o ad altri soggetti in base a situazioni che 
rispettano i criteri tecnici stabiliti dalla Commissione europea a norma dell'articolo 40, 
paragrafo 1, lettera b), della terza direttiva antiriciclaggio.‖ 
One of the most interesting features of simplified due diligence is that the beneficiaries 
of the Decree are exempt from registration in Centralized Computer Archive, although 
it must demonstrate that they gathered enough information to determine whether it is 
possible to apply the simplified procedure. For example, the beneficiary must verify the 
identity of the client, acquiring data about his name, legal status, registered office, and 
tax code; moreover, they are obliged to verify the persistence of the conditions for the 
application of the simplified procedure and its frequency is determined in accordance 
with the risk-based approach. 
Finally, in paragraph 6 of Article 25
95
 there are cases in which recipients are not 
required to carry out the obligations of customer due diligence; in any case, if there are 
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sensi dell'articolo 3, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 1781/2006. Per quanto 
concerne le operazioni di pagamento nazionali, il limite di 250 euro di cui alla presente 
lettera è aumentato a 500 euro; e) qualunque altro prodotto o transazione 
caratterizzato da un basso rischio di riciclaggio e/o di finanziamento del terrorismo che 
soddisfi i criteri tecnici stabiliti dalla Commissione europea a norma dell'articolo 40, 
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doubts about the information obtained, it is necessary to apply the ordinary due 
diligence.  
 
For the purpose of this paper it is more interesting to look at the enhanced due diligence. 
The enhanced due diligence consists on the adoption of more detailed and frequent 
measures, that must be made in different areas for an adequate control. For example, it 
requires the acquisition of more information about the identification data of the 
customer or the beneficial owner; moreover, it is required to increase the frequency of 
monitoring continous controls and, with regard to occasional operations, it is required to 
carried out further investigation on the nature and purpose of the transaction. 
Article 28 of the Decree provides this throught controls when: 
 The customer is not physically present, or, in case of a legal entity, its legal 
representative; to compensate this risk there are specific measures to be taken, 
which are listed on Article 28. These measures are: the assessment of the 
customer through documents and additional measures, in order to verify the 
veracity of what has been provided, if a payment has already been made it must 
verify that this operation has been carried out through an account opened in 
customer‟ name; in this way it is possible to verify the existence of the client. 
There are some cases in which the physical presence of the customer is not 
necessary, for example when the identification and verification have already 
been carried out; if the recipient of the decree collaborates with third parties for 
the due diligence and those carried out checks, as required by article 29 of the 
Decree; if the recipient acquires public documents, private documents 
authenticated. 
In the event that the customer is not physically present and there is also the 
absence of direct contact with the third party, which could be internet banking 
and phone banking it is essential to pay more attention, because greater is the 
risk of fraud related to electronic identity theft and can seriously affect the 
reliability of the data collected. 
Obviously, in extreme cases where it is not possible to obtain data and 
information needed or is not possible to verify its reliability, otherwise there is 
no confirmation about the coincidence of the customer with the entity or person 
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51 
 
to whom the data are related, or, after the check inconsistencies have emerged, 
the supervisor cannot begin or continue the relationship with the customer and it 
must assess whether to send a suspicious transaction report or not. 
 In the case of Politically Exposed Person and residents in the country who are or 
have been entrusted with public prominent; PEPs are defined by Third Money 
Laundering Directive as “natural persons who are or have been entrusted with 
prominent public functions and immediate family members, or person known to 
be close associates, of such persons”. This definition only applies to those who 
reside out of state. Because of their position PEP status may lead to a client 
being considered high risk, and thus it is necessary an enhanced due diligence. 
The supervisors must, on a risk sensitive basis, to have appropriate risk based 
procedures to determine whether a customer is a PEP; to do this, in addition to 
obtaining the relevant information from the customer, they must use additional 
sources, such as commercial databases of the countries of origin. Moreover, 
they should take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and 
source of funds of such customers; if the supervisor is unable to verify the 
reliability of the PEP, it cannot continue the relationship. 
 In the case of correspondent accounts with non-EU entities; in this case they 
gather information about its activities and on the supervision to which it is 
subject; 
 
Moreover, Bank of Italy
96
 identifies other situation in which the supervisors should 
adopt enhanced due diligence:  
 In the case of transactions of cash payment from other countries: if the value of 
the transaction is equal to or greater than 10,000 euros the recipient is required 
to obtain a copy of the cash transfers statement, as considered by Article 3 of the 
legislative decree n. 195/2008; if it cannot get this statement, it gives up the 
operation and evaluates whether to send a suspicious transaction report to FIU. 
 If there is suspicion of high risk of money laundering it has already been sent to 
FIU the suspicious transaction report;  
 If the customer uses products, operations, technologies that can increase the risk 
of money laundering. To this end, supervisors must remain informed of new 
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types of laundering, both nationally and internationally; they can use also the 
indicators identified by the Bank of Italy‟s Handbook. 
 
Finally, as it was highlighted in the First Chapter, launders often hold dirty money in 
cash: the use of large bills, like 500 euro and 200 euro, presents a greater money 
laundering risk, since it facilitates the transfer of large amounts of cash, favouring 
untraceable financial transactions; however, at the same time, this method is risky and 
often is preferable to use checks, bank or credit cards which are more secure. Therefore, 
in the presence of withdrawal and payment with use of large bills for amounts 
exceeding € 2,500, recipients must carry out specific investigations, also together with 
the customer, in order to verify the reasons behind this operation, allowing for the 
exclusion of any connection with money laundering. Such considerations are even more 
important in the case of customers who have a significant financial handling both 
considering the frequency of operations and their amount, such as the case of a 
business. 
 
2.7 Reporting of suspicious transactions 
In the previous pages it has been described what are the warning signs that may lead the 
suspicion of money laundering: as we have seen, this happens during the due diligence, 
which, thanks to the problem indicators‟ identification, identifies risky situations. The 
next step is the reporting to the authorities responsible for the suspicious transaction.  
Ongoing monitoring and review of accounts and transactions will enable banks to 
identify suspicious activity, eliminate false positive and report correct suspicious 
transactions. This requirement was introduced so that the signals sent to UIF can bring 
out operations for the completion of which are used money or securities of dubious 
origin to be reinvested into the legal economy. According to art. 41 of Decree 231/2007, 
the recipients of this law must “inviano all‘UIF, una segnalazione di operazione 
sospetta quando sanno, sospettano o hanno motivi ragionevoli per sospettare che siano 
in corso o che siano state compiute o tentate operazioni di riciclaggio o di 
finanziamento del terrorismo. Il sospetto è desunto dalle caratteristiche, entità, natura 
dell‟operazione o da qualsivoglia altra circostanza conosciuta in ragione delle funzioni 
esercitate, tenuto conto anche della capacità economica e dell‟attività svolta dal 
soggetto cui è riferita, in base agli elementi a disposizione dei segnalanti, acquisiti nell‘ 
ambito dell‟attività svolta ovvero a seguito del conferimento di un incarico. E‘ un 
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elemento di sospetto il ricorso frequente o ingiustificato a operazioni in contante, anche 
se non in violazione dei limiti di cui all‘art. 49, e, in particolare, il prelievo o il 
versamento in contante con intermediari finanziari di importo pari o superiore a 15000 
euro”. 
This Decree introduced active cooperation obligation: in the precedence role of law 
legislator had imposed the reporting requirement for each operation "che induca a 
ritenere che il denaro, i beni o le utilità oggetto delle operazioni possano provenire dai 
delitti previsti dagli articoli 648 bis e 648 ter del codice penale"
97
. With Article 41 it is 
made a step forward in the fight against money laundering , because now it is sufficient 
the suspect that there are transactions of money laundering
98
 to make report to FIU. This 
was necessary to resolve the operational and normative uncertainty, because it is not 
possible to list all circumstances that could lead to an advisory.  
It is clear that cooperation envisaged in the Decree 231/2007 requires greater attention 
and a careful screening activities, why was expanded sphere of hypotheses to be 
reported, since the indicators that can lead to an alert were expanded. 
As it has previously been said, the report is the result of a comprehensive review of all 
available information; when FIU receives it, through a financial analysis, it performs 
further investigations. In the case where there are elements that have mafia origin, the 
alert will be sent to Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, DIA; otherwise, it will be sent to 
Nucleo Speciale Polizia Valutaria, NSPV. 
 
2.8 Registration obligation 
The last duty for the recipients of Decree 231/2007 is registration requirement in 
Centralized Computer Archive, provided by article 36: according to this article 
supervisors must keep documents and record the information acquired; this ensures 
traceability and the ability to trace over time the customers‟ cash flows. 
The Centralized Computer Archive, enabling the traceability of financial flows within 
the system, is a fundamental aid in the prevention and combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing and is the main computer tool to identify suspicious transactions. 
Furthermore, in order to fulfill the obligations of customer due diligence, supervisors 
must keep documents and record the information acquired in order to be used by FIU or 
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other competent authorities in their investigations: in fact, they must keep both the 
documents required during the due diligence and the other writings and records of 
transactions for ten years. 
Between the information that must be kept on the Archive, beyond the generality of the 
delegates and the beneficial owner, there is the obligation to record transactions 
involving the movement of money for a total greater than or equal to 15.000, because 
this amount represents an element of suspect, even if connected or split. This amount 
must consider portioned transaction and connected operations: more in detail, for 
partitioned transaction the Legislator refers to a set of operations performed at different 
times, but which, from an economic point of view, is considerable as a unique 
operation; with regard to connected operation, these are those who are not the execution 
of the same contract but are mutually connected to the person who performs them. 
 
When talking about the obligation related to Decree 231/2007 it is important to 
remember that there exists a traceability principle: all the steps made by the supervisor 
must be reconstructed from the documents in its possession, so that if another person 
carries out the checks, he should be able to verify each step performed. The correct 
application of this standard enables the correct delineation of the responsibilities of 
those involved in the evaluation process. 
 
2.9 An overview of active collaboration in Italy 
The last part of Second Chapter allows obtaining an overview of the role that banks and 
other entities have in combating the laundering of dirty money: this analysis will be 
made by looking at the FIU‟s annual report and at the National Risk Assessment99. 
An effective implementation of money laundering legislation requires the full 
knowledge of the purposes and principles that sustain the system and National Risk 
Assessment (NRA), in accordance with FATF Recommendations, helps to identify, 
analyse and assess the threats of money laundering and terrorist financing, identifying 
what are the methods to carry out these activities and identify which are the 
vulnerability of the prevention system. 
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As explained in the previous Chapter, Italy, for various reasons, both economically and 
socially, has a high risk of money laundering, especially because much of dirty money 
is introduced into the legal economy. This is also shown on NRA, in which Italy has 
identified a high „significant risk‟ of money laundering. This phenomenon has increased 
because of the economic crisis, which has offered for launders new opportunity to 
growth, such as in companies with liquidity crisis, because they need money but their 
economic situation does not allow him to borrow it „legally‟. 
 
On the other side, NRA clarifies that the Italian preventing and combating system 
appears adequate; this is proved also by the positive trend of the reports received. Table 
1
100
 shows this: from 2010 to 2014 there is an increase of 14% of reports received. In 
the first half of 2015 there is also a growth, compared with the first half of 2014. 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
total total total total 1st seme total 1st seme 
received 37.321 49.075 67.047 64.601 37.575 71.758 39.021 
ml 37.047 48.836 66.855 64.415 37.543 71.661 38.883 
analyzed 26.963 30.596 60.078 92.415 39.731 75.857 40.372 
% variat 43,1% 13,5% 96,4% 53,8% - -17,9% - 
Table 1 Source: FIU 2014 Annual report and Quaderni dell‘antiriciclaggio2015 
 
The second row of the Table shows how many reports descend from suspicion of 
money laundering, that is the large majority of total sum: this clarifies why the use of 
active collaboration is so important in the fight against money laundering.  
The last two rows refer to the total number of reports that have been analysed: as 
explained above, FIU performs financial analysis, which consists of a series of activities 
aimed at expanding the original context advised by banks or other institutions. As an 
example, FIU identifies subjects of reporting and the ties that thay have undertaken, 
reconstruct the cash flows underlying the operations described and identify the 
transactions related to money laundering purposes. Finally, the information obtained by 
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 Source https://uif.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni/2015/quaderni-1-2015/index.html 
and Rapporto Annuale dell‟Unita di Informazione Finanziaria (2015). 
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FIU allow to classify suspicious transactions and identify and define the types and 
patterns of irregular behavior that broadcast to supervisors.  
The last row represents the variation percentage of analysed reports from previous year: 
these results were achieved thanks to the continuous improvement of work processes 
that can benefit from increased availability of information sources and thanks to a better 
resources‟ organization.  
 
The NRA also shows that the obligations of Decree 231/2007 are not applied 
uniformly
101
: Graph 1 shows this assertion. It is clear that most of suspicion activity 
reporing comes from Bank and Poste; this trend is growing, year by year.  
 
Banche e Poste
82%
Fiancial 
interme
13%
Professionals
3%
Non financial 
ope
2%
Reporting institutions
 
                Graph 1 Source: FIU 2014 Annual report 
 
These data may be explained by the fact that, as it has already been explained above, 
banks have personal interests, such as reputation, to intervene strongly against money 
launderes. On the other side, professionals have not yet a key role in the sending of 
suspected warning: this is due to inability to manage the monitoring requirements, 
caused by inadequate training and for fear of revenge, although this figure has grown by 
20% compared to 2013. The largest contribution comes from the notaries, with 91.5% 
of reports sended, in line with the previous year. Specifically, the role of notaries is very 
important considering the signing of real estate transactions and the creation of 
corporate acts.  
                                                 
101
 This work considered banks (about 700), financial intermediaries generally (about 700 and 
150 investment companies), professionals (more than 4,600 notaries, 230,600 lawyers, 115,000 
accountants), and other parties obliged by Decree 231/2007, including game operators. 
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With regard to the first, the previous chapter explained that real estate is one of the most 
used to clean dirty money; in this case the anomalies detected are usually suspected 
based on the origin of the funds used and on atypical payment. 
Considering use of legitimate business for money laundering purposes, the main 
suspects came from the acquisition or sale of companies, in particular companies that 
were in financial difficulties; from interposition of nominees or from the inclusion in 
society of persons involved in investigations. 
With regard to non financial operators there is an increase, from 851 suspected warning 
of 2013 to 1148 of 2014; more than 90% of these were submitted by games and betting 
management. This sector is very exposed to money laundering risk; money launderers 
use this sector both using dirty money to play or bets, or invest it by opening, for 
example, a casino. In particular, the NRA states that ―Il comparto del gioco, sia illegale 
sia legale, risulta di altissimo interesse per la criminalità organizzata, per la quale ha 
storicamente costituito una importante forma di sovvenzione. Attualmente la criminalità 
mafiosa investe nel settore dei giochi acquisendo e intestando a prestanome sale da 
gioco, sia per percepire rapidamente guadagni consistenti (soprattutto se le regole 
vengono alterate per azzerare le possibilità di vincita dei giocatori o per abbattere 
l‘ammontare dei prelievi erariali), sia per riciclare capitali illecitamente acquisiti‖102 . 
 
A further analysis is to see the final rating that was attributed Fui and compare it with 
the risk level assigned by the sender of the report, becuause appropopriate risk reporting 
evaluation is useful not only for FIU itself but also for investigative bodies that can take 
into account the two assessments. Table 2 reports a FUI Reports‟ evaluation103: this 
comparison shows a convergence between the ratings for more than 70% of reports 
analyzed in 2014 compared to those of 2013. This convergence is greatly increased, and 
this factor implies that the analysis carried out by banks or professionals have improved; 
the remaining differences between the two types of signaling may be due to 
characteristics of the obliged entity, for example because of their size or the quality of 
their control systems. 
 
                                                 
102
 Comitato sicurezza finanziaria ”Analisi nazionale dei rischi di riciclaggio e 
finanziamento del terrorismo 2014‖, page 13. 
103
 Rapporto Annuale dell‟Unita di Informazione Finanziaria (2015), page 43. 
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Table 2 Source: FIU 2014 Annual report 
 
 
Finally, considering the topic that will be discussed in the next Chapter, it is useful to 
know how many suspected signals come from regions that will be analysed, Emilia-
Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte. Even if, as it has been explained at the beginning of 
the Chapter, it is not true that the regions where it come more alerts are the most 
dangerous, it is possible to use this data to compare with the other regions.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the reports received: Lombardia, as in previous years, 
is the region that has sent more warning, with 13.021 reports, about 18% of the total. 
The others regions in red, Campania and Lazio, have sent respectively 8786 (12,2%) 
and 8948 (12,5%) reports.  
With regard to the regions under consideration, Emilia-Romagna sent more reports in 
2014, 4760, approximately 6.6% of the total; Piemonte has sent 4667 (6.5%) reports, 
with an increase of 30.5%
104
 compared to 2013 and Liguria has sent 2,195 (3.1%) 
reports, with an increase of 24.6% compared to 2013. All three regions are located in 
the first half of the list, they are then regions that send a large number of reports. 
 
                                                 
104
 This was one of the largest increases compared with 2013. 
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 Figure 1 Source: FIU 2014 Annual report 
 
Another method used to see what is the danger that the proceeds of illegal activities can 
be reintegrated into the formal economy is to analyze the use of cash. In the First 
Chapter it has seen that often dirty money is held in cash, because in this way it is not 
traceable. NRA about this information analyzed the abnormal or excessive payments in 
cash and divided the provinces a four categories based on their risk, high, medium-high, 
medium, medium-low and low. Taking into account the provinces where there are 
criminal organizations analyzed in the next Chapter, considering 17 provinces in which 
these criminal companies are established their headquarters, 8 are in the medium-high 
level risk (Torino, Savona, Imperia, Rimini, Novara, Alessandria, Verbano-Cusio), 6 in 
the medium-low risk (Ferrara, Forlì-Cesena, Genova, Piacenza, Vercelli, Cuneo) and 
only 3 in the low risk (Reggio Emilia, Parma, Modena). This information shows that 
more than half of pronvince are considered at risk of money laundering; the result is 
supported by the data presented in the FIU annual report where the three regions are 
considered at risk of money laundering. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that an effective collaboration requires not only active 
timeliness of communication, but also requires the quality and completeness of the 
information. This is also created with a complex prevention system of money 
laundering, that, considering in particular Italy, as has already been explained, suffers a 
very significant money laundering risk.  
In its document, NRA to strengthen both the analytical work of the persons obliged by 
the Decree and, above all, to improve the communication with FIU: about this, to 
encourage active cooperation, FIU has introduced, in collaboration with the in charge 
ministries, the definition of specific indicators of anomalies. Moreover, from 2012 UIF 
started meetings program with leading entities reporting, focusing on behaviors that are 
difficult to detect. 
 
The importance of the principle of active collaboration was highlighted by Tarantola
105
, 
who in 2011 argued that: “È dunque cruciale l‘impegno sostanziale degli operatori e il 
coinvolgimento effettivo del vertice aziendale che deve assumersi la responsabilità di 
adottare modelli organizzativi e gestionali efficaci e promuovere la più ampia 
diffusione della cultura antiriciclaggio, attivando le opportune leve gestionali e di 
incentivazione del personale”.  
 
Conclusively, it can be said that the activities of prevention and combating money 
laundering has recorded significant progress in recent years, also baceause there is 
awareness of the serious threat that laundering has for economic development and 
financial stability. It is not only a national problem: in a globalized world, the only 
effective response to the proliferation of economic crime goes through the achievement 
of a greater convergence of standards and in strengthening cooperation between 
countries and international investigative authorities; this is also demonstrated by the 
Fourth Directive, which has the purpose of further harmonize anti money laundering 
measures. 
These initiatives are even more important in the current economic environment, that 
was affected by the recent financial crisis. 
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 Anna Maria Tarantola  “Prevenzione e contrasto del riciclaggio: l‘azione della Banca 
d‘Italia” , page 10. 
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As we have seen above, this need for coordination is felt at national level; Decree 231 is 
based on cooperation and coordination between obliged authorities, FIU and the other 
entities. This is demonstrated by the positive results achieved by Financial  Intelligence 
Unit. 
To effectively combat criminal infiltration in the economy is essential the contribution 
of all the beneficiaries of the Anti money laundering requirements: the focus on 
prevention of money laundering must become a constant practice operational, based on 
risk based approach; it must overcome the formal approach of the past. 
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Third Chapter  
Check of the relationship between criminal 
companies and equity investment: an analysis of 
Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte firms 
 
The previous Chapters had the purposes both to show how companies can be used to 
launder money and why criminals choose this way in respect of holding dirty money in 
cash; the other purpose was to analyse the role that banks and other intermediaries have 
in the fight against money laundering. These entities use anomaly indicators that reduce 
the margins of uncertainty and allow to properly fulfilling their obligations. The role of 
these entities, as demonstrated by the reports of the Financial Intelligence Unit, is 
critical because it allows to detect an increasing number of suspicious transactions.  
The objective of those involved in criminal activities is to disguise the source of money 
and to convert the dirty money and wash it so it will be difficult to retrace its origins: 
one way to do this is placing dirty money in legal businesses. 
The aim of this Chapter is to understand if criminal companies hold more equity 
participation in respect to non-criminal companies; moreover, the next step will be to 
understand why criminals choose to acquire shares; these hypotheses will be formulated 
starting from the information obtained from the data analysis and from information 
given by the First and Second Chapters. 
This study follows other research which had the aim of identifying features of criminals 
companies in northern Italy; the analyses were performed comparing financial index 
and balance sheet items of criminal companies with a sample of non-criminal 
companies. Now, after finding the equity participation of each criminal company from 
Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte, it is found a sample of non-criminal companies 
that have similar characteristics to those criminal, such as production sector or 
headquarters‟ province.  
All the analysis in this Chapter are made with Stata program. 
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3.1 Riskiness in Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte 
Given that in the following pages it will be analysed companies, both criminal and non-
criminal, of these three regions, it helps to know how and why organized crime is 
located in these regions.  
First of all, it is known that organized crime plays a large part of its activities in 
Northern Italy, mainly because it is richer than the South. Since 1994 the Anti-Mafia 
Commission attested the existence of “una vastissima ramificazione di forme varie di 
criminalità organizzata di tipo mafioso, praticamente in tutte le regioni d‘Italia‖106. It 
is interesting to notice that, as reported by Enzo Fantò
107
, criminals penetrate into 
northern Italy economy not with force or imposition, but by offering them money 
coming from illegal activities. 
Looking at PON Progetto Sicurezza 2007-2013 – Gli investimenti delle Mafie108, it 
perceives that these regions, especially Liguria and Piemonte have a high IPM (Indice 
Presenza Mafiosa)
109
, that confirms a marked presence of organized crime
110
. This 
index was calculated taking in consideration: murders with mafia origin; numbers of 
reported person for criminal association; municipalities and governments loose for 
mafia infiltration; assets confiscated from organized crime; DIA reports. 
Watching Italian provinces‟ lists with the highest IPM, Imperia is at 16th position, 
Genova 17
th
 and Torino at 20
th
, instead Milano is at 26
th
 position: this data is very 
significant because it shows that these cities are subject to greater risk than the richest 
city in the north Italy, Milano. 
 
In detail, for each region can be said that: 
 Emilia Romagna, despite the economic crisis, remains one of the Italian regions 
with the highest income; thanks to a homogeneous development in various 
production sectors such as industry, agriculture or the services sector. Moreover, 
it plays an important role at national level, as it is the connection between the 
north and south-central Italy. For all these reasons this region has always 
                                                 
106
 Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni 
criminali similari, Relation on: “insediamenti e infiltrazioni di soggetti ed organizzazioni di tipo 
mafioso in aree non tradizionali‖. Roma, December 1993.  
107
 Enzo Fantò, L‘impresa a partecipazione mafiosa- Economia legale e economia 
criminale, page 192. 
108
 This report was made by Transcrime and Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
109
 This index was created by Transcrime. 
110
 In the IPM‟s rank Liguria is at 6th position, Piemonte at 7th and Emilia-Romagna at 12th 
position. 
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attracted organized crime: in fact the last Sos-Impresa report indicates that: ―La 
crisi economica in un‘area caratterizzata da un‘imprenditorialità diffusa ha 
creato quel terreno fertile nel quale l‘usura si è insinuata quale credito 
sussidiario a quello bancario [...]. Nel triangolo Modena-Reggio Emilia-Parma, 
si segnala la presenza consolidata di gruppi camorristici del casertano attivi 
anche nelle pratiche Camorristiche e della ‗ndrangheta che gestisce da anni il 
comparto delle bische clandestine e del gioco d‘azzardo‖. 
 Liguria baits criminal both because it is a border area, and because it is the 
headquarters of major ports like Savona, Genova, La Spezia. With regard of the 
first point, Liguria allows access to Costa Azzurra where, from the ‟70, mafia 
clans have woven articulated logistic networks for business and the management 
of important businesses, exploiting the friendly relations with the Marseilles 
crime. Considering the second point, Liguria with its harbours allows connection 
with Italian and foreign regions, so criminals can both move their goods both 
their dirty money. Moreover, Liguria is famous for its casino, like San Remo 
Casino: as it was said in previous Chapters, casino is a very easy way to launder 
dirty money. 
 In Piemonte there is the first municipality that was dissolved for mafia crimes, 
Bardonecchia. This happened because lot mafia criminals lived in Piemonte and 
have established their criminal activities, including money laundering. 
Considering that Piemonte is one of the richest regions of Italy, it is not difficult 
to find companies that want to invest dirty money. 
 
As reported in Second Chapter, also the FIU‟s report showed critical issues in these 
three regions. 
 
3.2 Steps of the research 
As it has been said above, this research is the result of other thesis, which, after 
analysing the recycling operations conducted by law enforcement agency, identified a 
list of people embroiled in money laundering. Later, thanks to Telemaco, it had looked 
to see if these people were members or shareholders of companies. The starting 
assumption is that these people use companies to launder money or to conceal illegal 
activities. 
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First, in order to carry out these analyses, beginning from criminal database of Emilia-
Romagna, Liguria and Piemonte, it is found all the balance sheet that has financial 
assets other than zero. For clarity, it is useful to remember what Financial Assets items 
are: 
―1) partecipazioni in:  
a) imprese controllate;  
b) imprese collegate;  
c) imprese controllanti;  
d) altre imprese 
2) crediti:  
     a) verso imprese collegate 
     b) verso imprese controllate; 
    c) verso controllanti;  
   d) verso altri;  
3) altri titoli 
4) azioni proprie, con indicazione anche del valore nominale complessivo‖ 
 
For this research will be considered only the values of point 1). After obtaining the list 
of criminal companies with financial assets other than zero, the following step is to 
download from the database Telemaco the additional notes of these balance sheets. In 
this way it is possible to see which companies owned equity participation, rather 
receivable, securities and own shares: this is the database with all criminal companies 
balance sheets and their eventual equity participation. The list was then inserted into the 
database Stata. Note that for each firm could be more than one year observation, 
because for criminal database is taking in consideration all the years in which criminals 
were fulfilling a position of manager or shareholder. 
In order to make a proper analysis a sample was selected from the database that contains 
all the non-criminal enterprises of the three regions and, for companies with financial 
assets other than zero it is downloading their additional notes, doing as it is described 
above. This sample was selected considering companies that have similar feature to 
those criminal, such as: size, Ateco codes and province where is located the 
headquarter. 
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The final database has all criminal and control balance sheet items, including other 
information that will be analysed, such as: 
 Total number of participation, this is Total Participation variable;  
 County in which the subsidiaries are located;  
 Share of participation, this is Quota Mean variable; 
 Business name of the subsidiaries. 
 
Unfortunately, many additional notes refer only to the euro amount of the equity 
investment and not the interest held in percentage; this is the reason why the sample of 
the Quota Mean model is smaller than the sample of Total Participation model. 
 
The analyses have a sample of 336 companies, of which: 
 169 are criminal companies; 
 167 are control companies. 
 
The total number of firms‟ year observation is 1708, of which 991 belong to control 
companies and 717 belong to criminal companies. 
 
3.3 The research Hypothesis 
The involvement of legitimate businesses in all phases of the laundering process, 
combined with a global and high speed funds movement, has provided the means for 
criminal activity to continue to grow at an exponential rate. For this reason financial 
institution, auditors and the other recipients of Decree 231/2007 must take a new look at 
how they evaluate their commercial customers from a money laundering risk 
perspective, in order to more effectively identify and mitigate risk. One way to find 
criminal activity is to detect anomalies between the accounting items. In particular, this 
thesis will analyse the Total Participation item, comparing the sample of criminal 
companies with the sample of  non-criminal companies.  
At this point it is useful to formulate some hypothesis about the relationship between 
Total Participation variable and Criminal variable: specifically, Total Participation is 
total number of minority interest for each company and Criminal variable is a 
dichotomous variable and takes value zero in the case of non-criminal company and 
takes value one in case of criminal company. The questions are: do criminal companies 
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have more holdings in respect to non-criminals? Is this relationship influenced by other 
variables? Are there any differences between the regions taken in consideration? Do 
criminal companies detect more equity participation in foreign company than those non-
criminals? Do criminal companies have on average a higher share of equity 
participation in respect to those non-criminal? Finally, why criminals decide to hold 
shares on other companies, rather than investing money in other things, such as in 
illegal activities? 
The analysis that will be made in the next few pages will try to answer this question, 
isolating the variables, in order to study their impact on Total number of participation 
and Criminal variable. The starting points are the information obtained on what has 
been argued in previous Chapters: specifically, in the First Chapter it is listed some 
ways to use companies for laundering money; it can be assumed that the use of the 
equity investments can be combined with another of the techniques that have been 
described in First Chapter. This assumption is based on the fact that criminals are not 
only interested in increasing the synergies, but also they want to derive benefits for their 
illegal activities. Transcrime‟s document111 shows that the company's economic growth 
is not the aim for the criminals, but criminals are interest to diversify investments, and 
this is also achieved by investing profits in new companies. The diversification of the 
investment portfolio, together with the use of nominees, also reduces the risk of 
confiscation and seizure. Moreover, the choice of investing money in equity 
participation may rely on the fact that equity participation, rather than the other assets, 
allow to better hide and clean the resources of criminal organizations and can be used as 
a screen to make false invoices to conceal and transfer income deriving from illegal 
activities. Specifically, in this case criminals can use the so called “imprese cartiere”: 
this kind if company is created only for producing paper, like invoices for services 
never made. The purpose of imprese cartiere is to conceal illegal activities and to 
launder money. Another reason that encourage criminals to detect equity investment 
could be the possibility to detect shares in foreign companies, particularly in low-tax 
countries or countries where company law is favourable and allows to hide the identity 
of the owner‟s share; in this way criminals can also take advantage of international 
trade-based money laundering method. Ping He showed that international trade-based 
operations is a typical money laundering technique, because ―using the international 
trade system, the criminal organisation would then be able to transfer illegal funds back 
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 Transcrime,  PON Progetto Sicurezza 2007-2013 – Gli investimenti delle Mafie, page 91. 
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into the country using the trade transaction to justify payments through the financial 
system”112. There are many reasons behind this choice: for example, international trade-
based operation allows to better conceal the proceeds of crime, thanks to the huge 
quantity and value of the commodity; secondly, it allows to benefit from freight, 
insurance and foreign currency exchange links; finally, and most important, this kind of 
trade permits to take advantage of the gaps existing in different countries‟ laws and on 
their information exchange.
113
 
The Second Chapter has shown what are the duties of the institutions who actively 
collaborate with the authorities and it has described what is the Customer Due 
Diligence, which is also based on observations of abnormal value. Obviously, each case 
must be considered for its characteristics; the acquisition of equity investments could 
allow criminals to transfer money from one company without suspecting banks or 
professionals, especially if the subsidiary is abroad. 
 
3.3.1 Equity investment and criminal variable 
The first and most simple analysis considers only the two variables Total Participation 
and Criminal variable. 
 
Tot. Part Tot. Part
Mean 0,220 Mean 0,901
Std. Dev. 0,642 Std. Dev. 4,942
obs 991 obs 717
 
Table 3 Mean and Standard errors Control                             Table 4 Mean and Standard errors Criminal 
 
Table 3 and 4 show that, on average, criminal companies have 0.9 participations,  
instead control companies have less participation, 0.22. These tables also show that 
standard deviation for criminal companies is high; this means that there is a greater 
dispersion. In fact, while the maximum number of participation for non-criminal 
enterprises is 5, for criminal enterprises it is 58. In order to not twist the results of the 
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 Ping He (2010), A typological study on money laundering, Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, Vol. 13 Iss 1, page 23. 
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 Ping He (2010), A typological study on money laundering, Journal of Money Laundering 
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70 
 
data analysis, it is decided to winsorize for 1% this variable: in this way it is possible to 
remove outliers, the extreme values which differ significantly from the mean. 
Now, we have new data: 
 
Tot. Part_w Tot. Part_w
Mean 0,220 Mean 0,425
Std. Dev. 0,642 Std. Dev. 1,142
obs 991 obs 717
 
Table 5 Mean and Standard errors for Control                      Table 6 Mean and Standard errors Criminal 
 
The tables show again that criminal companies have, on average, more equity 
participation than non-criminal companies. 
At this moment, it is possible to do other investigation, in order to analyse more in 
detail the existing relationship between these two variables. 
Table 7 shows the correlation between winsorized Total Participation and Criminal 
variable. 
 
Tot. Part_w
0,1137***
0,000
obs 1708
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Criminal
 
Table 7 Correlation between Participation and Criminal variable 
  
The first row is correlation coefficient, which shows the strength and direction of the 
association between these two variables.  As the sign of the correlation coefficient is 
positive, it can conclude that there is a positive correlation between the variables. This 
means that higher value of winsorized Total Participation is related to higher value of 
Criminal variable, which is when there is a criminal firm. The second row represents the 
level of statistical significance (i.e., the p-value), which  is 0.0000, which means that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. 
Even if this information is interesting, it must remember that correlation does not 
include the concept of cause and effect, but only to the relationship between variables. 
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Finally, in this first part it is introduced the t test, that compares the means of two 
groups, in this case being criminal or control firm. 
In this case the null hypothesis is that the two means are equal; if this hypothesis is true, 
it means that any differences between the two values are due to chance. 
 
Criminal obs Mean Std. Err.
0 991 0,220 0,020
1 717 0,425 0,043
1708
t = -4,725
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000  
Table 8 t test 
 
The Mean column shows that criminal firms have higher total number of participation 
compared to non-criminal firms. Moreover, the table shows that the group means are 
significantly different as the p-value in the Pr(|T| > |t|) row is 0.000: we can reject the 
null hypothesis, with a 5% significance level. 
Table 8 highlight that criminal companies have more participation than non-criminal: 
this result is in line with our expectations. The outcome, although interesting, needs to 
be further analysed, because in reality almost never an event depends solely on the 
performance of a certain factor. It is more useful to formulate a model that considers the 
possible influences; this analysis will be made later, with multivariate analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Regions and Ateco codes 
In this paragraph it is introduced other variables that will be used later: Ateco codes 
companies, indicating the sector in which operate companies, and the distribution of 
firms in the regions which are taking into consideration. As mentioned above, in order 
to have a uniform sample, for the control group it is selected companies that have 
headquarters and code Ateco similar to criminal companies. 
 Regions: since that this paper takes into account firms of tree regions, it has been 
created the following tables, illustrating the distribution in each region of 
criminal and non-criminal companies, with mean and standard deviation. 
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Control Criminal
Mean 0,281 0,324
Std. Dev. 0,650 1,010
obs 256 182
Tot. Part_w
Emilia-R
 
Table 9 Total Participation in Emilia-Romagna 
 
Control Criminal
Mean 0,134 0,234
Std. Dev. 0,450 0.771
obs 187 189
Liguria
Tot. Part_w
 
Table 10 Total Participation in Liguria 
 
Control Criminal
Mean 0,221 0,584
Std. Dev. 0,690 1,338
obs 548 346
Tot. Part_w
Piemonte
 
Table 11 Total Participation in Piemonte 
 
All Tables show that winsorized Total Participation is higher in case of criminal 
companies.  
In the following pages it will be analysed if being in one region in respect to 
another can change the relationship between equity participation and criminal 
factor. 
 Ateco codes: Graph 2 illustrate the distribution of all sample‟s companies for 
Ateco codes, divided by criminal and control firms. 
Graph 2 shows that more than 120, precisely 125 firms, belong to F codes, that 
is construction sector; this confirms what has been said in the First Chapter, that 
is, that the building sector is one of the most used to launder money and it is one 
of the most interesting sector to study the phenomenon of money laundering. In 
general, criminals prefer to invest in areas where the business risk is moderate 
and competition is limited: these features are found in the construction industry 
and in the retail business. Another sector that has always been used by launders 
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is the real estate; in fact, the Table 11 shows that in our sample there are 17 
companies that belong to this branch.  
 
        
Graph 2 Distribution of Ateco codes 
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Table 11 Description of present‘ Ateco sectors 
 
In future research, the dummy variables of Ateco codes will be included in the 
regression, as the number of investments and the criminal factor can be 
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influenced by business sector: in fact, as we have already said, there are 
economic areas in which there are several criminal companies in respect to other 
areas. 
 
3.4  Description of the variables 
In this section it is analysed, through the use of Table 12, all the variable that will be 
further taken into consideration. The purpose of this Chapter is to check whether there 
exist a relationship between Total Participation and Criminal variables; then it will go 
over, and through regression will occur if it is possible to predict scores on one variable 
from the scores on a second variable. In previous pages it is shown that, looking only at 
these two variable, there is a significant relationship, that is, criminal companies have 
higher Total Participation value.   
However, as mentioned above, the t test shows whether the dependent variable, in this 
case Total Participation, depends on the trend of the other, that is if the company is 
criminal or not. For a more correct analysis it is necessary to use the multivariate 
regression, because in this way it is possible to consider other variables that may 
influence both the dependent variable as the independent variable, in order to obtain a 
„clean‟ report: these control variables would have otherwise affected the result if not 
considered in the model. 
Now, for each variable that will be used, it is indicate its number of observation, mean, 
standard deviation and the 25
th
 , 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles. 
 
Obs. Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Criminal 1708 0,420 0,494 0 0 1
Tot.Part._w 1708 0,306 0,892 0 0 0
Ln.Attivo_w 1708 13,105 1,776 12,104 13,308 14,304
Roe_w 1707 0,052 1,055 -0,049 0,043 0,234
Leverage_w 1707 16,994 54,800 1,621 4,552 13,570
Quota_media 341 0,217 0,332 0 0 0,5  
Table 12 Description of variable used for multivariate regression 
 
Since it is decided to winsorize Total Participation, to be fair it is also winsorized the 
other variables. Specifically, in addition to the two variables that are already used, the 
Table shows:  
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 The logarithm of Total assets: using the logarithm is taken into account company 
size. In fact it would be wrong to use the Total assets item, because this value 
depends greatly on the size of the firm and has a highly skewed distribution; 
using the logarithm is obtained a symmetrical distribution; 
 ROE (Return on Equity), given by net income over equity, is a measure of 
profitability that calculates how many euros of profit a company generates with 
each euros of shareholders' equity. This indicator can be used to evaluate how 
management is able to manage its own resources to increase corporate profits. 
ROE is not only determined by the choices made in the context of operational 
management, but also by the decisions on the financial and asset management. 
The ROE is useful for comparing the profitability of a company to that of  
other firms in the same industry. 
 Another factor that can influence the presence or absence of equity investments 
is the leverage, given by Total Liabilities over Equity. It shows how a company 
is able to finance its investments, especially if finances them with equity capital 
or borrowed capital; it plays a fundamental influence on profitability. 
 Finally, it will be considered the mean share of participation,  in the next pages it 
will be made a regression in order to see if criminal companies have, on average, 
an higher share of participation in respect to non-criminal companies 
 
3.4.1 Correlation matrix 
In this paragraph it is explained the correlation between the variables mentioned above, 
with the purpose to know the strength and direction that exists between two variables. 
Table 13 shows the correlation coefficient and the number of observation for each 
correlation. Moreover, it is highlighted with asterisk, the significance level: it is placed 
three asterisk next to the correlation score if the result is statistically significant and the 
p-value is lower than 0,01; there are two asterisk if the p-value if between 0,01 and 0,05 
and one if the p-value is lower than 0,10. 
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Table 13 Correlation matrix 
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Looking at correlation coefficients of Criminal column, it is possible to see that this 
variable has, as already be mentioned, a positive correlation with winsorized Total 
Participation variable. Moreover, it has a positive correlation with the logarithm of 
winsorized Total assets, means that criminal companies are related to higher value of 
logarithm of winsorized Total assets. The same works for winsorized ROE; criminal 
companies are associated to greater Total Participation values.  
With regard to winsorized Total Participation, this value has, as expected, a positive 
correlation with the logarithm of winsorized Total assets. This because Assets 
representing the complex of investments and economic resources of the company: 
among these resources there are equity  investments, which are investments intended to 
remain permanently in the company.  
Both the variables Total Participation and Criminal factor has positive and significant 
correlation with Liguria and Piemonte variables, but not with Emilia-Romagna variable. 
Finally, there is positive and significant correlation between Quota mean and Total 
Participation; the same is with Criminal factor. 
 
3.5 Multivariate regression 
This is the most interesting part of this Chapter, and it is the culmination of this 
research.  
In the previous pages it has seen that Criminal variable influences winsorized Total 
Participation variable: first, through the correlation it is seen that in the presence of 
criminal companies there is a higher value of investments; the result was also confirmed 
by the t test. However, as it has already been explained, these analyses are not sufficient 
to confirm that a variables influence the other: it is necessary to conduct a multivariate 
analysis, which takes into account factors that can influence these two variables. This 
type of regression makes it possible to know if the total of equity investments change in 
criminal companies in respect to non-criminal, holding constant other variables; this 
analysis is necessary because it is uncorrected do a simple regression using as sample 
companies from different industries and of different sizes. 
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VARIABLE 
 
(1)                     
Tot.Part_w 
(2) 
Tot.Part_w 
(3) 
Tot.Part_w 
(4) 
Tot.Part_w 
Criminal  
0,186** 0,169* 0,174** 0,179** 
 
(0,091) (0,088) (0,088) (0, 087) 
Ln.Attivo_w   
0,078*** 0,079*** 0,086*** 
  
(0, 026) (0,026) (0,028) 
Roe_w    
-0,034* -0,058** 
   
(0,020) (0,025) 
Leverage_w     
-0,001* 
    
(0,0001) 
       
Constant  
4,814*** 3,516*** -0,903*** -0,965*** 
 
(0,091) (0,483) (0,30) (0,311) 
       Dummy_ateco yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 
 
1708 1708 1707 1707 
R-squared 
 
0,287 0,305 0,307 0,310 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 14 Multivariate regression 
 
Table 14, on first column, shows that winsorized Total Participation is positively 
correlated with Criminal factor; moreover, the coefficient for Criminal is significantly 
different from zero because its p-value is lower than 0,05, as it is indicated by the two 
asterisks. This is the simplest model, because it tells how much the dependent variable 
is expected to increase when the independent variable increases by one, regardless of 
the company activity‟s sector. 
The second model includes a very important variable, the logarithm of Total assets, 
which, as has been said before, is used to erase the effect "size" of the company. This 
model is more accurate than the first, as this affects the very variable number of 
participation held by the company, as it was also shown in Table 13. This result show 
that company size influence Total Participation variable, that is, larger companies have 
more equity participation. 
The last two columns considers a sample of 1707 observation instead 1708 because one 
observation has Equity equal to zero. The third and the fourth models include 
winsorized ROE and winsorized Leverage, because it is assumed that the decision to 
hold shares also depends on the return on capital and the degree of indebtedness. Both 
this regression coefficient have a negative signs. The leverage coefficient shows that, as 
it was predictable, higher is the degree of debt, lower is the total number of 
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participation. The sign of ROE is a consequence of this data, because ROE depends on 
Leverage: the more the Leverage is high, the more the ROE increases, and vice versa. 
The final result of this set of regressions is very interesting: even if the coefficient 
logarithm of Total assets is always positive and significant, with p-value near zero, also 
Criminal factor has positive and significant correlation. This means that, regardless of 
company size, sector, ROE and leverage, criminal companies have higher Total 
Participation value. 
 
3.6 Multivariate regression by Regions 
In this paragraph it will be made a multivariate regression between independent 
variables considering the three regions: in this way it will be possible to see if this 
variables change results that were previously obtained.  
Beside Criminal and Emilia variable, it is taken into account the variable Cri*Emilia, 
that has value equal to one if the company is criminal and it is located in Emilia; it has 
value equal to zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 Multivariate regression- Emilia Romagna 
VARIABLE 
 
(1)                     
Tot.Part_w 
(2)
Tot.Part_w 
(3) 
Tot.Part_w 
(4) 
Tot.Part_w 
Criminal  
0,243** 0,228** 0,232** 0,240** 
 
(0,112) (0,106) (0,107) (0,107) 
Emilia 
0,154 0,147 0,145 0,158 
(0,107) (0,108) (0,109) (0,109) 
Cri*Emilia 
-0,228 -0,232 -0,233 -0,243 
(0,186) (0.187) (0,187) (0,187) 
Ln.Attivo_w   
0,078*** 0,079*** 0,086*** 
  
(0, 026) (0,026) (0,028) 
Roe_w    
-0,034* -0,059** 
   
(0,019) (0,025) 
Leverage_w     
-0,001** 
    
(0,0005) 
       
Constant  
4.757*** 3.459*** -0,986*** -1,072*** 
 
(0,112) (0491) (0,289) (0,308) 
       Dummy_ateco yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 
 
1708 1708 1707 1707 
R-squared 
 
0, 290 0,309 0, 310 0,314 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 15 shows that, in all the models, Criminal factor is positively related to Total 
Participation, and p-value is always lower than 0,05, means that criminal variable 
explains a significant proportion of the variance of Total Participation. This was 
confirmed also by Table 13, in which the correlation between Total Participation and 
Emilia variable was not significant. As regard to Emilia and Cri*Emilia variables, their 
p-value is higher than 0,10 and it is possible to ignore these variables. This means that 
variables Emilia and Cri*Emilia does not need to explain this model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 Multivariate regression- Liguria 
 
With regard to the model related to Liguria region, it is possible to conclude the same 
thing: Criminal factor is  positively correlated and is significant, with p-value lower 
than 0,10; on the other side, Liguria and Cri*Liguria does not explain variable in Total 
Participation, even if Table 13 shown positive and significance correlation between 
Total Participation and Liguria variables.  
Finally, Table 17 shows that neither region variables nor criminal variable explain the 
model; they useless in predicting Total Participation variable.  
VARIABLE 
 
(1)                     
Tot.Part_w 
(2)
Tot.Part_w 
(3) 
Tot.Part_w 
(4) 
Tot.Part_w 
Criminal  
0,216** 0,197* 0,203* 0,206* 
 
(0,112) (0,107) (0,108) (0, 108) 
Liguria 
0,051 0,074 0,078 0,070 
(0,128) (0,126) (0,026) (0,126) 
Cri*Liguria 
-0,128 -0,123 -0,130 -0,119 
(0,176) (0,174) (0,175) (0,174) 
Ln.Attivo_w   
0,078*** 0,079*** 0,086*** 
  
(0, 026) (0,026) (0,028) 
Roe_w    
-0,035* -0,058** 
   
(0,020) (0,025) 
Leverage_w     
-0,001* 
    
(0,0005) 
       
Constant  
4.784*** 3.49*** -0,926*** -0,985*** 
 
(0,111) (0,494) (0,31) (0,320) 
       Dummy_ateco yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 
 
1708 1708 1707 1707 
R-squared 
 
0,288 0,306 0,308 0,311 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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The results of this paragraph reveal that Regions variable are not statistically significant 
for our model; this means that the positive and significant correlation found on Table 13 
between Region and Criminal variables depends on other variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 Multivariate regression - Piemonte 
 
3.7 Quota Analysis 
The last part of this research focuses on quota analysis: in this way it is made a  model, 
in order to explain the relationship between Mean of total Participation variable from 
Criminal variable, taken the others variable constant. The aim of this part is to 
understand if criminal enterprises tend to have a greater share of participation in respect 
to non-criminal firms. 
The variable Mean of total participation is calculated by averaging the investments held 
every year. 
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
(1)                     
Tot.Part_w 
(2) 
Tot.Part_w 
(3) 
Tot.Part_w 
(4) 
Tot.Part_w 
Criminal  
0,047 0,031 0,032 0,038 
 
(0,101) (0,102) (0,103) (0, 103) 
Piemonte 
-0,153 -0,161 -0,162 -0,167* 
(0,101) (0,101) (0,101) (0,101) 
Cri*Piemonte 
-0,265 -0,263 -0,268 0,267 
(0,183) (0,179) (0,177) (0,178) 
Ln.Attivo_w   
0,078*** 0,079*** 0,086*** 
  
(0, 026) (0,026) (0,028) 
Roe_w    
-0,036* -0,056** 
   
(0,196) (0,025) 
Leverage_w     
-0,001* 
    
(0,0001) 
       
Constant  
4.841*** 3.550*** -0,851*** -0,922*** 
 
(0,153) (0,505) (0,277) (0,291) 
       Dummy_ateco yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 
 
1708 1708 1707 1707 
R-squared 
 
0,292 0,311 0,313 0,316 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 18 Quota analysis 
 
Table 18 shows that Criminal factor is positively correlated with Quota mean, 
independently from the other variables: in case of  criminal company, quota mean is 
0,13 higher than in the case of non-criminal company. 
Surprisingly, p-value shows that company size does not affect the average share owned 
by each company; this variable is influenced not only by the criminal factor, but by 
ROE and Leverage. In particular, our sample shows that with an increase of ROE there 
is a decrease of quota mean: this suggests that companies with a high ROE prefer to 
hold low participation. As stated above, ROE depends also on company‟s leverage and 
this is the reason why the two coefficient have the same sign. The sign of leverage 
shows that companies with a high debt ratios tend to have lower average share of 
participation. 
 
3.8 Overview of the analysis 
Finally, the last part of this Chapter has the aim to summarize the results of this 
research, taking in consideration the hypothesis. 
With regard to the relation between criminal companies and Total Participation item, 
the result of the t test, the correlation matrix and especially the multivariate regression 
VARIABLE 
 
(1)                     
Quota_media 
(2)  
Quota_media 
(3)  
Quota_media 
(4)  
Quota_media 
Criminal  
0,137** 0,127* 0,128* 0,131** 
 
(0, 066) (0,068) (0,067) (0, 108) 
Ln.Attivo_w   
0,156 0,019 0,021 
  
(0, 023) (0,021) (0,020) 
Roe_w    
-0,031* -0,048** 
   
(0,017) (0,021) 
Leverage_w     
-0,001** 
    
(0,0004) 
       
Constant  
-0,102 0,178 -0,138 -0,114 
 
(0,066) (0,334) (0,316) (0,302) 
       Dummy_ateco yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 
 
341 341 341 341 
  
    
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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showed the hypothesis that criminal enterprises hold more equity participation than non-
criminals was confirmed. As stated above, the  reason behind this choice could rely on 
several factors: in this case it was assumed that the criminals acquire participation to 
create a group and be able to transfer from company to company money and goods; 
moreover, if a company has subsidiary, it is more easily to make false invoices, in order 
to move dirty money. Finally, this method satisfies the need to transfer income, so the 
company that is in good situation has a lower tax base, while the company which is in 
difficulty will have an highest total assets.  
The goal is the concealment of the criminal origin of the proceeds, because if a 
company has equity participation in other company can frequently transfer and split 
dirty money; the money launders create an apparent legal origin of the money by 
fabricating transactions, such as invoices and other agreement with the use of false 
documents. This opinion is also supported by PON Progetto Sicurezza 2007-2013 – Gli 
investimenti delle Mafie
114
, which argues that an abnormal level of non-financial and 
non-tax receivables can hide a criminal company. In order to hide their activities, 
criminals use outputs to other companies, including their subsidiaries, increasing the 
value of „trade receivables‟ and „receivables from associated or subsidiary companies‟. 
These results also show that, for the purposes of this analysis, the variables that identify 
the region where the business is located are not significant, so it is possible to say that in 
order to evaluate the relationship between criminal enterprises and equity investments it 
doesn‟t matter if they are located in Emilia-Romagna, Liguria or Piemonte. 
With regard to quota analysis, the results showed that in these three regions criminal 
enterprises have an higher average level of participation, this probably because 
criminals want to hold the majority and, in this way, set their rules. 
Finally, it would be very interesting to examine if criminals companies hold more 
investments abroad than non-criminals; in fact today, thanks to globalization, it is very 
easy to hold investments in foreign companies. It must pay specific attention to this 
circumstance, especially if the subsidiary is located in low-tax countries or in those 
states where it is not necessary to identify the holder of the company's shares. 
Furthermore, the holding of shares on foreign companies allows the creation of 
„corporate boxes‟ that confuse control activities. Unfortunately in the sample that was 
taken into consideration because only 5 companies own shares abroad, too small 
number to perform valued analyses. 
                                                 
114
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Conclusion 
 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to identify the signals in the companies‟ management 
that can be used in risk assessment models or for criminal infiltration prevention; in 
particular, this elaborate concerns the equity investments item. 
The itinerary that has been discussed in this Paper was designed to see if criminal 
companies use, among the methods to clean dirty money, equity investment in other 
companies. Since that there is not a lot of literature on this topic, it was conducted an 
empirical analysis on a sample of companies from three regions: Emilia-Romagna, 
Liguria and Piemonte. 
Summarizing the previous Chapters: 
 The First Chapter has shown that laundering techniques using criminal 
connected companies are many and always changing, in order to avoid 
regulatory control. The entrance of dirty money in the economy affects the 
proper function of markets and distorts competition between individuals and 
firms. In particular, it is seen that criminals tend to participate in the limited 
companies or in companies that are in financial difficulties. Moreover, there are 
other reasons that lead to launder dirty money in companies, such as creating 
new profit, having control of the territory and the increasing of social consensus; 
these reasons influence the choices of whether to settle the company and what 
kind of economic sector choose. 
Finally, it is important to remember that criminals are using companies to 
launder money cash because in this way it is easier to separate money from its 
illicit origin. 
 The Second Chapter has shown what is the active cooperation and it has 
described what are the tasks that institution, like banks, must conduct against 
their client. Decree 231/2007, as it was seen above, lists entities‟ obligation, 
which are: customer due diligence obligation; abstention‟ obligation from 
completing the transaction; registration obligation; mandatory reporting of 
suspicious transactions. This was also underlined by the Fourth Directive, that 
wants the money laundering risk assessment is carried out at the appropriate 
level and with the necessary flexibility. This element is linked to a fundamental 
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principle, the risk-based approach, which is the most adequate method to deal 
with new threats, because it allows to graduate controls. In fact, as it has been 
said many times, the risk of money laundering is not always the same because it 
is constantly changing. Another important element, which is connected with the 
First Chapter, is the need to identify the beneficial owners: this is essential to 
identify people who may conceal their identity within a company. This is 
possible due to customer due diligence, which consists on carrying out checks 
with the aim to identify customers. 
Conclusively, the Fourth Directive stressed on the focus to create greater 
harmonization of anti-money laundering measures, in order to make them more 
homogeneous in the countries. 
 The last Chapter focused on analysis of a companies‟ sample, both criminal and 
non-criminal: the aim was to see if criminal companies tend to have more equity 
participation in respect to non-criminal. 
In order to have a complete analysis, it was made the t test, the correlation 
matrix and the multivariate regression. The results showed that, taking into 
account only the Criminal variables and Total Participations, there is a positive 
and significant relationship, that is, criminal enterprises have an higher Total 
Participation value compared to non-criminals. At a later time, the multivariate 
analysis showed that there is a relationship between these two variables, and this 
relationship does not depend on factors such as business sector, ROE, size and 
leverage of the companies.  
At the end of this first analysis, it is stated that criminal companies have higher 
value of Total Participation in respect to those non-criminal and this difference 
is significant. 
 
In order to explain the reasons behind these results it is useful confront what has 
been previously said. First of all, it has been explained what are the five reasons 
that bring criminals to invest in the legal economy; these reasons may also 
explain why the criminal companies have more equity participation than non-
criminals, because with equity participation is more easily to achieve these 
goals. 
- The main reason that encourages criminals to invest in companies is the 
possibility to conceal their criminal activities: through subsidiaries, they can 
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mask illicit flows, by means of false invoices, which produce commercial 
receivables. Criminals can also create 'corporate boxes' to make difficult the 
traceability of goods and to hide the beneficial owner. This danger occurs 
especially when the subsidiaries are foreign companies. 
In particular, the use of “imprese cartiere” allows to better hide criminal 
activities: in the case that subsidiary is an impresa cartiere it is conceivable 
that its value of production have a strong variability from year to year, 
because its purpose is to launder money, not make business.   
- There are economic reasons that may be of interest to criminals, such as the 
creation of synergies to reduce costs, even if profit maximization is not 
necessarily the primary target for criminals. 
- There are social reasons: for example, if the criminal‟s objective is the 
maximization of social consensus, the choice of the sector in which to invest 
depends on the ease with which the criminal organization is able to offer 
jobs work; in this case criminals want to take participation in companies that 
require a lot of manpower. 
- Finally, there are strategic reasons, because by acquiring controlling stakes 
in new territories increase the area in which criminals carry out illegal 
activities. In this way they also get the support of new people, thus, increase 
their power of corruption. Moreover structures and subsidiaries resources 
can also be used in the fulfilment of illegal activities, for example the offices 
of a company can become headquarters for criminal organization meetings. 
 
Since that criminals have different reasons to invest dirty money in legal 
activities, the decision to invest in a sector rather than another depends on the 
purpose they want to achieve.  
 
As crime and money laundering methods evolve, the perceptions of the characteristics 
of business change as well. Financial institution, in particular, should expand their CDD 
and obtain a clear understanding of the nature of the customer‟s business and activities. 
These analysis could be translated into risk indicators to be used in developing the 
common risk assessment model. 
The results obtained in this thesis are very interesting, even if it was taken into account 
only three regions; as mentioned above, the existing relationship between criminal 
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companies and equity participation is useful for the improvement of money laundering‟s 
risk assessment and the creation of a better fight against organized crime. 
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